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Pre‐publication	+	NOT	final	+	DO	NOT	CITE	OR	QUOTE	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	REFORM	AND	INTIMATIONS	OF	CITIZENSHIP	
	
Nan	D.	Hunter†	
Illness	 is	 the	 night‐side	 of	 life,	 a	more	 onerous	 citizenship.	 	 Everyone	who	 is	 born	
holds	dual	citizenship,	in	the	kingdom	of	the	well	and	in	the	kingdom	of	the	sick.	
Susan	Sontag1	
Introduction	
Sometimes	what	is	implied	and	inferred	can	be	as	important	as	what	is	stated.		In	this	
Article,	I	argue	that	the	political	debate	that	preceded	the	enactment	of	the	Patient	Protec‐
tion	and	Affordable	Care	Act	(PPACA),2	as	well	as	the	legal	debate	that	now	swirls	around	
the	question	of	its	constitutionality,	mask	a	foundational	question	about	national	identity.		
PPACA,	of	course,	does	not	literally	constitute	or	reconstitute	citizenship	(although	it	does	
require	 legal	residence	as	 the	price	of	admission).3	 	But	 it	creates	the	potential	 for	broad	
public	 conversation—as	 has	 never	 before	 occurred	 in	 the	 United	 States—regarding	 the	
question	 of	what	 the	 relationship	 should	 be	 between	membership	 in	 the	American	 com‐
munity	and	meaningful	access	to	health	care.	
 
† Professor	of	Law	and	Associate	Dean	for	Graduate	Programs,	Georgetown	University	Law	Center.		I	very	much	appreciate	
the	research	assistance	provided	by	Katherine	Record,	Heather	Sigler,	and	Kate	Stewart	and	the	editorial	work	by	the	University	
of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review	staff.	
1 Susan	Sontag,	Illness	As	Metaphor	3	(1978).	
2 Pub.	L.	No.	111‐148,	124	Stat.	119	(2010)	(to	be	codified	as	amended	in	scattered	sections	of	21,	25,	26,	29,	and	42	U.S.C.).	3 See	PPACA	§	1312(f)(3),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18032(f)(3)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010)	(noting	that	qualified	individuals,	for	the	purpos‐
es	of	the	Act,	are	only	those	who	are	citizens	or	aliens	lawfully	present).	
  
At	face	value,	PPACA	primarily	seeks	to	make	the	individual	and	small‐group	health	in‐
surance	markets	rational	and	workable,	to	fill	the	enormous	gap	that	has	existed	in	cover‐
age,	and	to	create	insurance	exchanges	to	regulate	quality	and	police	access.4		Upon	full	im‐
plementation,	it	will	achieve	nearly	universal,	but	also	probably	quite	uneven,	coverage	and	
will	perpetuate	a	deeply	fragmented	model	of	social	insurance.		If	one	imagines	the	health	
care	system	as	a	political	domain,	with	the	various	institutions	and	subsystems	as	compo‐
nents,	PPACA	is	less	like	our	Constitution	and	more	like	a	reinvention	of	the	Articles	of	Con‐
federation.		Under	PPACA,	health	insurance	in	the	United	States	will	remain	a	federated	col‐
lection	of	risk	pools,	located	in	workplaces,	public	systems,	and	the	new	exchanges.	
Nonetheless,	 the	 debate	 that	 has	 accompanied	 PPACA’s	 adoption	 is	 about	 something	
bigger	 than	 spending	 curves,	 comparative	 effectiveness,	 or	 even	medical‐loss	 ratios	 (not	
that	any	of	those	should	be	considered	trivial).		The	deep	structure	of	this	hyper‐technical	
statute	gestures	to	the	existence	of	a	health	care	universe	that,	in	Habermasian	terms,	could	
be	its	own	lifeworld.5		For	persons	with	chronic	diseases,	the	health	care	system	truly	be‐
comes	a	world	unto	itself.		For	others,	it	may	be	more	like	a	foreign	country	visited	for	an	
intense	but	brief	period	of	time,	or	perhaps	one	to	which	we	pay	little	attention.6		Although	
the	 internal	 operations	of	 the	health	 care	universe	 are	 seldom	 thought	 of	 as	political,	 its	
 
4 I	do	not	mean	to	diminish	the	importance	of	PPACA’s	expansions	of	Medicare	and	especially	Medicaid.	 	 I	do	not	discuss	
them	in	this	article	because	they	are	extensions	of	existing	programs,	and	I	focus	here	on	PPACA’s	role	in	the	creation	of	new	in‐
stitutions	and	norms.	
5 Habermas	used	 the	 term	 “lifeworld”	 to	describe	major	domains	of	 social	 and	 individual	 life,	 such	as	 the	market	or	 the	
family.	 	See	 Jürgen	Habermas,	Between	Facts	and	Norms:	 	Contributions	to	a	Discourse	Theory	of	Law	and	Democracy	
353‐54	(William	Rehg	trans.,	1996).	
6 Thanks	to	Bill	Sage	for	suggesting	these	analogies.	
 power	is	such	that,	upon	entry,	it	may	bring	us	life	or	death,	profit	or	poverty,	autonomy	or	
dependency.	
In	the	interface	between	the	health	care	system	and	the	legal	system,	multiple	legal	pa‐
radigms	are	in	play.		For	questions	of	access	to	care	through	insurance,	a	mixture	of	con‐
tract	and	social	welfare	principles	dominate,	implicating	norms	of	social	solidarity	as	well	
as	the	exchange	of	defined	promises	and	entitlements.	 	As	Lawrence	Mead	has	noted,	so‐
cial	welfare	 programs	 that	 incorporate	 both	 benefits	 and	 reciprocal	 obligations	 provide	
individuals	with	an	“operational	definition	of	citizenship.”7	
PPACA	 creates	 a	 new	 social	welfare	 and	 insurance	 program	 that	 redesigns	 access	 to	
health	care.		Its	precise	impact	on	the	social	meanings	associated	with	individual	health	and	
the	health	of	the	nation	is	difficult	to	predict,	but	it	almost	certainly	will	be	powerful.		A	dis‐
course	on	belonging,	rights	and	obligations—a	discourse	on	citizenship—is	likely	to	evolve	
as	the	effects	of	the	reform	take	hold.		If	that	occurs,	the	question	will	not	be	whether	PPA‐
CA	will	provide	some	operational	definition	of	what	we	understand	to	be	the	scope	of	social	
citizenship,	but	how	it	does	so;	not	if	there	will	be	some	ethic	of	rights	and	obligations	that	
will	develop	around	the	new	law,	but	what	the	content	of	that	ethic	will	be.		As	in	real,	ra‐
ther	 than	metaphorical,	 citizenship,	belonging	 in	 the	reformed	health	care	system	will	be	
defined	in	part	by	those	who	are	not	permitted	to	belong,	and	rights	will	be	defined	in	part	
by	 their	 circumscription.	 	 The	 determination	 of	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 individual	 mandate,	
 
7 Lawrence	M.	Mead,	Beyond	Entitlement:		The	Social	Obligations	of	Citizenship	249	(1986).	
  
which	is	occurring	in	the	current	litigation	challenging	the	constitutionality	of	PPACA,8	will	
profoundly	shape	the	nature	of	its	ethic	of	obligation.	
The	debates	 about	PPACA	 illustrate	 that	 constitutional	 concepts	 are	 intertwined	with	
narrative	understandings	of	 government	authority	 and	 individual	 rights	 and	duties.	 	The	
trope	of	the	“living	Constitution,”	for	example,	began	with	Franklin	Roosevelt,	who	asserted	
that	we	have	a	 “living	Constitution”	as	part	of	his	argument	 that	 the	Depression	necessi‐
tated	a	more	capacious	scope	 for	executive	branch	authority.9	 	More	recently,	 the	phrase	
has	figured	prominently	in	debates	over	originalism	and	has	been	invoked	as	an	interpre‐
tive	 premise	 for	 justifying	 heightened	 judicial	 review	of	 laws	 curbing	 individual	 rights.10		
PPACA	may	usher	in	yet	another	dimension	of	a	“living	Constitution”:		not	as	a	more	expan‐
sive	understanding	of	government	power	or	of	individual	rights,	but	of	our	shared	obliga‐
tions	to	one	another.	
This	Article	anticipates	how	the	new	health	governance	structures	that	PPACA	creates	
may	reshape	the	social	meanings,	in	addition	to	the	finances	and	mechanics,	of	the	Ameri‐
can	health	 system.	 	 I	develop	a	 concept	of	 “citizenship	practices”	 to	describe	 the	 compo‐
 
8 See	infra	note	98	and	accompanying	text.	
9 See	Jeff	Shesol,	Supreme	Power	304,	458‐59	(2010)	(arguing	that	President	Roosevelt	strongly	believed	that	the	Justic‐
es’	belief	in	a	“living	Constitution”	was	necessary	for	his	ambitious	social	programs	to	survive).	
10 The	 phrase	 “living	 Constitution”	 has	 been	 used	 with	 distaste	 by	 some—and	 admiration	 by	 others—to	 describe	
rights‐enhancing	models	of	 constitutional	 interpretation.	Compare	Robert	H.	Bork,	Neutral	Principles	 and	Some	First	Amend‐
ment	Problems,	47	Ind.	L.J.	1,	1	(1971)	(calling	“deplorable”	the	fact	that	“the	nature	of	the	Constitution	will	change,	often	quite	
dramatically,	as	the	personnel	of	the	Supreme	Court	changes”),	and	William	H.	Rehnquist,	The	Notion	of	a	Living	Constitution,	54	
Tex.	L.	Rev.	 693,	 706	 (1976)	 (describing	 a	 view	of	 a	 “living	 Constitution”	 that	would	 allow	 “appointed	 federal	 judges	 to	 im‐
pose	.	.	.	a	rule	of	conduct	that	the	popular	elected	branches	of	governance	would	not	have	enacted”	as	“genuinely	corrosive	of	the	
fundamental	values	of	our	democratic	society”),	with	Adam	Winkler,	A	Revolution	Too	Soon:	 	Woman	Suffragists	and	the	“Living	
Constitution,”	76	N.Y.U.	L.	Rev.	1456,	1523	(2001)	(noting	that	woman	suffragists	advanced	the	concept	of	a	living	Constitution	by	
looking	behind	the	text	and	amplifying	principles	embedded	within	the	document	as	“restorative	of	the	commitments	of	American	
democracy	and	mandated	by	the	demands	of	reason”).	
 nents	associated	with	 the	relationship	between	 the	 individual	and	 the	collective.	 	 I	argue	
for	using	citizenship	practices	as	a	substitute	for	the	overused	metaphor	of	citizenship	and	
as	a	way	of	capturing	the	dynamic	of	belonging,	rights,	and	obligations.		This	dynamic	exists	
in	multiple	social	and	political	locations	beyond	the	terms	of	the	legal	status	of	an	individu‐
al	with	a	particular	sovereign	state,	and	thus	the	frame	of	citizenship	practices	offers	a	bet‐
ter	conceptual	tool	for	understanding	the	social	meaning	of	new	patterns	of	behavior	and	
belief.	
In	analyzing	citizenship	practices	related	to	PPACA,	I	address	how	the	process	by	which	
PPACA	creates	new	 institutions	will	 shape	 the	actions	of	 individuals	 interacting	with	 the	
health	system,	including	their	participation	in	various,	usually	localized	institutions	of	go‐
vernance.	These	new	regularized	practices	have	the	potential	to	lead	to	new	discourses	and	
understandings	 about	 the	 interrelationship	 between	 individualism	 and	 collectivity,	 and	
about	 the	 public	 and	private	 dimensions	 of	 the	 health	 system.	 	 The	 concept	 of	 citizenship	
practices	is	intended	to	capture	both	the	new	activities	and	the	new	consciousness.	
Of	greatest	importance	to	this	emerging	discourse	is	the	individual	mandate	portion	of	
PPACA.11		Under	the	Act’s	“minimum	essential	coverage”	provision,	all	but	a	small	number	
of	 Americans	must	 either	 purchase	 health	 insurance	 or	 pay	 a	 penalty.12	 	 The	 individual	
mandate	 requires	most	U.S.	 residents	 to	 obtain	 health	 insurance	 for	 themselves	 and	 their	
 
11 PPACA	§	1501(b),	26	U.S.C.A.	§	5000A	(West	Supp.	1A	2010).			
12 Id.		The	mandate	applies	to	residents	lawfully	in	the	United	States,	except	those	who	are	incarcerated,	who	file	a	religious	
conscience	objection,	or	who	participate	in	a	preexisting	health	care	sharing	ministry.		Id.,	26	U.S.C.A.	§	5000A(d).		In	addition,	des‐
ignated	exemptions	are	made	for	American	Indians,	individuals	lacking	insurance	for	three	months	or	less,	or	those	eligible	for	a	
“hardship	exemption”	based	on	 low	 income.	 	 Id.,	 26	U.S.C.A.	 §	5000A(e).	 	 Individuals	 eligible	 for	 a	hardship	exemption	 include	
those	for	whom	the	cost	of	the	lowest	available	plan	after	applicable	subsidies	are	applied	exceeds	eight	percent	of	income,	those	
with	income	less	than	the	federal	income	tax	filing	threshold,	or	those	otherwise	defined	by	the	Secretary	to	have	“suffered	a	hard‐
ship	with	respect	to	the	capability	to	obtain	coverage	under	a	qualified	health	plan.”		Id.	
  
dependents	no	later	than	2014;	those	who	do	not	comply	will	be	subject	to	a	tax	penalty.13		
Enrollment	in	most	private	sector	health	plans	will	satisfy	the	mandate;	acceptable	plans	in‐
clude	employer‐sponsored	policies,14	policies	sold	on	the	individual	market,	existing	health	
plans	grandfathered	 into	 the	new	regulations,	or	any	other	plan	or	policy	providing	“mini‐
mum	essential	coverage”	as	defined	by	the	Secretary	of	Health	and	Human	Services.15		Those	
who	enroll	in	public	plans	such	as	Medicaid	or	Medicare	will	also	be	in	compliance.16	
Part	I	of	this	article	provides	a	framework	for	analyzing	the	relationships	between	citi‐
zenship	concepts	and	social	insurance	systems	such	as	PPACA.		I	describe	the	inexactitude	
of	both	theory	and	law	as	to	the	obligations	of	citizenship	in	the	United	States	and	discuss	
the	ways	in	which	a	tradition	of	consumer	citizens	has	filled	in	some	of	the	gaps	in	the	social	
meaning	of	citizenship.		I	also	examine	the	role	of	social	insurance	programs,	specifically	as‐
sessing	the	Social	Security	system	to	demonstrate	how	a	concrete	model	of	social	citizenship	
can	develop.	
Part	 II	 turns	 to	 the	 specific	 example	 of	 PPACA	 and	 examines	 both	 the	 structural	 and	
symbolic	 roles	played	by	 the	 individual	mandate.	 	 I	argue	 that	 the	current	 litigation	over	
 
13 Id.	§	1501(b),	26	U.S.C.A.	§	5000A(b).		The	tax	penalty	will	be	the	greater	of	a	flat	tax	(starting	at	$95	in	2014,	increasing	
to	$695	by	2016,	and	thereafter	subject	to	cost‐of‐living	adjustments)	or	an	income‐based	tax	(starting	at	1%	of	income	in	2014,	
increasing	to	2.5%	by	2016).		Id.	§	10106(b)(1),	26	U.S.C.A.	§	5000A(c)(2)(B);			Health	Care	and	Education	Reconciliation	Act	of	
2010	 §	 1002,	 26	 U.S.C.A.	 §	5000A(c)(3)(d).	 	 A	 reduced	 (one‐half)	 penalty	 will	 apply	 for	 failure	 to	 insure	 children.	 	 PPACA	
§	1501(b),	26	U.S.C.A.	§	5000A(c)(3)(C).	 	By	2016,	penalties	will	be	capped	at	the	greater	of	2.5%	of	income	or	three	times	the	
individual	penalty,	and	may	not	exceed	the	national	average	premium	cost	of	the	least	expensive	plan	sold	on	the	applicable	ex‐
change.		Id.	§	10106(b)(1),	26	U.S.C.A.	§	5000A(c)(2)(B).	
14 PPACA’s	“pay	or	play”	provision	creates	a	mandate	for	large	employers,	requiring	them	to	either	offer	employees	a	min‐
imum	coverage	option	(play),	cover	the	cost	sharing	subsidy,	or	provide	a	tax	credit	for	employees	to	purchase	coverage	on	an	
exchange	(pay).		Id.	§	1513(a),	26	U.S.C.A.	§	4980H.	15 Id.	§	1501(b),	26	U.S.C.A.	§	5000A(f).	
16 Id.	
 the	constitutionality	of	PPACA	has	generated	a	contest	of	signification	between	the	compet‐
ing	 values	 associated	with	 economic	 liberty	 and	 the	 social	 compact.	 	 Thus,	while	 the	 Su‐
preme	Court	will	decide	whether	the	individual	mandate	is	valid	based	on	its	interpretation	
of	congressional	power	under	Article	I,	 the	popular	understanding	of	this	debate	 is	much	
more	grounded	in	a	contest	of	meaning	over	how	much	the	individual	can	be	forced	to	par‐
ticipate	in	a	social	insurance	system.	
Part	III	elaborates	on	the	concept	of	citizenship	practices	and	its	usefulness	in	analyzing	
structures	for	participation	in	American	society.		I	explain	the	concept	of	citizenship	prac‐
tices	 as	 referring	 to	 regularized	behaviors	 and	 interactions	with	 a	 system	of	 governance	
and	 a	 coherent	 (although	 not	 necessarily	 universal)	 set	 of	 beliefs	 about	 the	meaning	 of	
those	behaviors.		I	then	examine	specific	and	concrete	governance	issues	that	must	be	ad‐
dressed	 in	 the	 implementation	 phases	 of	 PPACA	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 resolution	 of	 those	
questions	could	enhance	or	inhibit	an	understanding	of	PPACA	as	a	new	form	of	social	citi‐
zenship	in	the	United	States.	
I.		Social	Insurance	and	the	Epistemology	of	Citizenship	
Social	insurance	programs	operate,	in	many	ways,	as	instruments	of	governance.		They	
channel,	incentivize,	and	penalize	behaviors;	establish	systems	of	rights	and	requirements;	
distribute	risks	and	provide	a	promise	of	collective	security	against	shared	risk;	and	define	
membership	in	a	collective	undertaking.17	 	In	social	 insurance,	as	in	structures	of	govern‐
ment,	a	tension	exists	between	the	goals	of	collective	good	and	of	individual	freedom.		The	
 
17 See	generally	Richard	V.	Ericson	et	al.,	Insurance	as	Governance	35‐46	(2003)	(describing	the	collective	sharing	of	
risk	as	“the	hallmark	of	citizenship	in	strong	social	democracies”).	
  
identification	and	pricing	of	 risk,	 financed	and	subsidized	by	public	 funds,	effectively	 im‐
plements	 redistributive	 policy	 decisions.	 	 Even	 private	 insurance	 performs	 critical	 social	
functions:		Tom	Baker	has	described	insurance	law	principles	as	a	“guide	to	the	social	com‐
pact,”18	and	Jeffrey	Stempel	argues	that	insurance	policies	function	as	“social	institutions	or	
social	instruments	.	.	.	often	acting	as	adjunct	arms	of	governance”19	and	as	“part	of	the	so‐
cial	policy	infrastructure.”20	
Pooling	risk	as	a	method	of	achieving	security	characterizes	both	social	insurance	pro‐
grams	and	private	insurance	policies.		It	is	only	in	the	former,	however,	that	the	shared	un‐
derstandings	of	such	systems	create	a	sense	of	social	solidarity.		Social	insurance	exists	in	
an	epistemological	space	where	notions	of	common	good	intersect	with	beliefs	about	indi‐
vidual	obligation.		As	a	result,	social	insurance	aligns	with	the	conceptual	trilogy	of	belong‐
ing,	rights,	and	duties	that	is	essential	to	any	meaning	of	citizenship.21	
This	Part	examines	how	the	concepts	and	functioning	of	social	insurance	systems	relate	
to	understandings	of	citizenship.		The	dominant	theme	in	citizenship	theory	has	been	an	ar‐
ticulation	of	rights.		My	focus	is	different:		I	look	more	deeply	into	the	duties	associated	with	
the	citizen	role	and	into	the	question	of	how	program‐design	structure	can	shape	individual	
participation	in	governance	activities.		I	analyze	how	these	components	of	citizenship	as	a	so‐
 
18 Tom	Baker,	On	the	Genealogy	of	Moral	Hazard,	75	Tex.	L.	Rev.	237,	291	(1996).	19 Jeffrey	W.	Stempel,	The	Insurance	Policy	as	Social	Instrument	and	Social	Institution,	51	Wm.	&	Mary	L.	Rev.	1489,	1495	
(2010).	
20 Id.	at	1511.	
21 See	infra	notes	22‐47	and	accompanying	text.		I	borrow	the	term	“belonging”	from	Kenneth	Karst	and	intend	it	to	encom‐
pass	norms	of	participation	and	social	solidarity.		See	generally	Kenneth	Karst,	Belonging	to	America:		Equal	Citizenship	and	
the	Constitution	(1989).	
 cial	role—rather	than	of	citizenship	as	a	formal	legal	status—operate	in	social	insurance	sys‐
tems.	
In	doing	so,	 I	 apply	 insights	 from	non‐legal	 scholarship	about	 the	 interrelationship	of	
economic‐political	notions	of	 citizenship	and	 the	 socio‐political	 role	of	 consumers.	 	What	
political	scientists	have	labeled	as	a	right	of	participation	in	the	private	sector	has	histori‐
cally	 taken	the	 form	of	consumer	movements	or,	when	 limited	to	 the	workplace,	of	orga‐
nized	labor.		I	analyze	how	PPACA	offers	the	potential	for	testing	whether	individuals	will	
act	as	“consumer	citizens”	in	the	new	health	insurance	system.	
Finally,	to	establish	a	rough	set	of	benchmarks	for	assessing	the	likely	impact	of	PPACA	
on	understandings	of	citizenship,	I	conclude	this	Part	with	a	discussion	of	Social	Security.	
A.		The	Obligations	of	Citizenship	
Citizenship‐related	scholarship	has	blossomed	into	an	academic	cottage	industry	in	re‐
cent	years,22	but	the	literature	has	incorporated	health	care	only	minimally	into	the	various	
categories	and	functions	described	by	the	leading	theorists.		Modern	citizenship	theory	be‐
gan	with	the	work	of	T.	H.	Marshall,	who,	writing	in	the	late	1940s	against	the	background	
of	a	new	British	national	health	system,	classified	health	care	as	a	social	right	rather	than	a	
 
22 See	Margaret	R.	Somers,	Genealogies	of	Citizenship	12‐14	(2008)	(“Since	being	awakened	from	a	long	dormancy	at	
the	end	of	the	twentieth	century,	studies	of	citizenship	have	been	making	up	for	lost	time	at	a	breathtaking	pace.”).		For	recent	
additions	 to	 the	 growing	 field	 of	 citizen‐related	 scholarship	 see,	 for	 example,	 Linda	Bosniak,	The	 Citizen	 and	 the	Alien	
(2008);	Thomas	Janoski,	Citizenship	and	Civil	Society	(1998).	
  
political	or	civil	right.23		Marshall	treated	health	care	as	he	did	education,	arguing	that	both	
were	essential	to	dignitary	rights	and	“equality	of	status.”24	
Marshall’s	 tripartite	 typology,	with	 its	social	 justice	orientation	and	 focus	on	 the	rela‐
tionship	between	citizenship	and	social	inequality,	addressed	only	the	nature	of	the	rights	
that	comprise	citizenship.25		Two	moves	by	later	scholars	of	citizenship	theory	are	particu‐
larly	relevant	to	the	project	of	understanding	how	American	social	 insurance	programs—
including	PPACA’s	new	model—can	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	citizenship.		First	is	the	work	of	
scholars	who	have	attempted	to	recuperate	the	centrality	of	obligations	as	part	of	the	social	
meaning	of	citizenship.	 	Second	is	the	addition	of	an	independent	right	of	participation	to	
Marshall’s	model.	
The	dominant	American	tradition	of	liberal	rights	has	long	existed	in	a	dialectical	rela‐
tionship	with	a	tradition	of	communitarian	relationships	and	obligations.26		The	concept	of	
citizenship	 as	 a	 reciprocal	 relationship	 dates	 from	 the	 liberal	 tradition	 that	 fueled	 the	
American	Revolution.27	 	 In	 the	same	vein,	Kenneth	Karst’s	work	on	 the	equal‐dignity	un‐
derstanding	of	citizenship	presupposes	“two	related	and	overlapping	values:		participation	
 
23 See	T.H.	Marshall,	Citizenship	and	Social	Class	54	(1950)	(describing	health	care	as	a	means	of	increasing	general	so‐
cial	welfare	and	providing	social	rights).	
24 Id.	at	56	(arguing	that	provision	of	social	services	is	not	designed	to	equalize	incomes,	but	rather	to	equalize	status	via	
“class	fusion”	when	all	members	of	society	share	a	“common	experience”).	
25 Marshall	only	briefly	discussed	concomitant	obligations	of	citizenship.		See	id.	at	60‐62	(giving	examples	of	subordination	
of	individual	rights	to	collective	need	in	housing	and	education).	
26 See,	e.g.,	Michael	Sandel,	Democracy’s	Discontent:	 	America	in	Search	of	a	Public	Philosophy	201‐49	(1996)	(dis‐
cussing	the	tension	between	the	voluntarist	conception	of	freedom	and	political	control).	
27 See	Linda	K.	Kerber,	No	Constitutional	Right	to	Be	Ladies:		Women	and	the	Obligations	of	Citizenship	8‐9	(1998)	
(describing	various	schools	of	thought	during	the	Revolutionary	period	grounded	in	the	belief	that	individuals	assumed	obliga‐
tions	to	the	state	when	accepting	citizenship	and	that	the	state	assumed	reciprocal	obligations);	Linda	K.	Kerber,	The	Meanings	of	
Citizenship,	84	J.	Am.	Hist.	833,	833‐36	(1997)	(asserting	that	the	founding	generation	“constructed	a	new	and	reciprocal	rela‐
tionship	between	state	and	citizen”).	
 and	responsibility	.	.	.	.	To	be	a	citizen	is	not	merely	to	be	a	consumer	of	rights,	but	to	be	re‐
sponsible	 to	 other	 members	 of	 the	 community.”28	 	 Despite	 the	 conventional	 pairing	 of	
rights	and	duties,	there	has	been	significantly	less	elaboration	of	the	responsibility	branch	
than	of	the	rights	branch,	either	in	political	theory29	or	in	constitutional	law	or	scholarship.		
A	robust	debate	about	obligations	of	citizenship	has	emerged,	however,	 in	 the	 legal	chal‐
lenges	to	PPACA.	
The	law	on	citizen	duties	that	does	exist	is	structured	in	concentric	circles,	moving	out‐
ward	from	those	obligations	linked	to	constitutional	text	to	those	that	are	at	most	implicit.		
Beginning	 at	 the	 core,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 upheld	 congressional	 authority	 under	 Ar‐
ticle	I’s	 enumerated	powers	 to	 compel	 citizens	 to	 render	military	 service30	and	 to	 file	 in‐
come	tax	returns	and	pay	the	appropriate	taxes.31	
The	second	concentric	circle	of	citizenship	duties	includes	those	that	one	can	reasona‐
bly	infer	from	constitutional	text.		For	example,	the	Supreme	Court	has	ruled	that	enacting	
a	statute	that	requires	individuals	to	appear	and	testify	in	court	upon	service	of	a	subpoena	
falls	 within	 Congress’s	 powers.32	 	 Even	 for	 this	 noncontroversial	 proposition,	 the	 Court	
sought	constitutional	authority	from	multiple	sources:		historical	tradition	dating	to	Eliza‐
bethan	England,	references	in	the	Fifth	and	Sixth	Amendments	to	the	rights	of	the	accused	
 
28 Kenneth	L.	Karst,	Foreword:		Equal	Citizenship	Under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	91	Harv.	L.	Rev.	1,	8‐9	(1977).	
29 See	Janoski,	supra	note	22,	at	53	(stating	that	“citizenship	theories	.	.	.	have	tended	to	ignore	duties	and	obligations”);	id.	
at	219	(describing	obligations	as	the	“theoretical	stepchild”	of	citizenship	theory).	 	Although	Janoski	criticized	the	tendency	of	
theorists	to	overlook	the	obligations	aspect	of	citizenship,	his	own	taxonomy	of	citizens’	obligations	is	fairly	shallow,	concentrat‐
ing	on	the	individual’s	duty	to	provide	financial	support	(presumably	by	paying	taxes).		Id.	at	53‐56.	
30 See,	e.g.,	Selective	Draft	Law	Cases,	245	U.S.	366,	387‐88	(1918)	(stating	that	attacks	on	the	constitutionality	of	a	selective	
draft	law	were	flawed,	as	compulsory	service	is	sanctioned	by	the	text	of	the	Constitution	and	grounded	in	historical	practice).	
31 See,	e.g.,	Brushaber	v.	Union	Pac.	R.R.,	240	U.S.	1,	17‐18	(1916)	(finding	that	the	Sixteenth	Amendment’s	income	tax	pro‐
visions	are	compatible	with	the	unquestioned	constitutional	authority	to	levy	income	taxes).	
32 See,	e.g.,	Blair	v.	United	States,	250	U.S.	273,	281‐82	(1919)	(finding	that	personal	obligations	must	be	put	aside	at	times	
in	order	to	perform	one’s	public	duties,	such	as	responding	to	a	subpoena).	
  
to	certain	 incidents	of	 trial,	and	historical	understandings	of	 the	 individual’s	duty	toward	
the	common	good.33		Similarly,	repeated	references	in	the	Constitution	to	juries34	implicitly	
support	the	conclusion	that	requiring	 jury	service	 is	a	concomitant	necessary	and	proper	
exercise	of	Congressional	power,	even	without	the	explicit	constitutional	mention	of	such	
service.	
The	third	and	outermost	circle	of	citizenship	duties	encompasses	the	broad	discretion	
recognized	 under	 the	 state	 police	 powers	 doctrine.35	 	Where	 a	 state’s	 police	 powers	 are	
implicated,	the	Court	has	invoked	communitarian	reasoning	and	rejected	claims	that	an	in‐
dividual’s	constitutionally	protected	liberty	was	violated.	 	For	example,	 in	Butler	v.	Perry,	
the	Court	relied	on	“ancient	usage	and	the	unanimity	of	 judicial	opinion”	to	reject	a	Thir‐
teenth	Amendment	challenge	to	a	state	law	requiring	every	able‐bodied	adult	male	to	con‐
tribute	physical	labor	to	the	maintenance	of	public	roads.36		Citing	Blackstone’s	Commenta‐
ries,	 which	 in	 turn	 cites	 Roman	 law,	 the	 Court	 justified	 the	 affirmative	 duty	 as	 a	
contemporary	 extrapolation	 from	 the	 first	 of	 the	 trinoda	 necessitas,	 namely,	 repair	 of	
 
33 See	Blair,	250	U.S.	at	281.		On	the	final	point,	the	Court	elaborated	that	
the	giving	of	testimony	and	the	attendance	upon	court	or	grand	jury	in	order	to	testify	are	public	duties	which	every	person	with‐
in	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Government	is	bound	to	perform	upon	being	properly	summoned	.	.	.	.	The	personal	sacrifice	involved	is	
a	part	of	the	necessary	contribution	of	the	individual	to	the	welfare	of	the	public.	
Id.	
34 See	U.S.	Const.	art.	III,	§	2	(“The	Trial	of	all	Crimes	.	.	.	shall	be	by	Jury	.	.	.	.”);	id.	amend.	VI	(granting	the	accused	the	right	
to	a	trial	“by	an	impartial	jury”);	id.	amend.	VII	(granting	the	right	to	a	jury	trial	at	common	law).	
35 For	example,	in	the	mid‐nineteenth	century,	the	Wisconsin	Supreme	Court	declared,	
There	are	very	many	 instances	 in	which	 the	citizen	 is	 required	to	perform	personal	 service,	or	render	aid	 to	his	government,	
without	other	compensation	than	that	of	his	participation	in	the	general	good,	and	his	enjoyment	of	the	general	security	and	ad‐
vantage	which	result	from	common	acquiescence	in	such	obligations	on	the	part	of	all	the	citizens	alike,	and	which	is	essential	to	
the	existence	and	safety	of	society.	
West	v.	State,	1	Wis.	209,	234	(1853).	
36 240	U.S.	328,	330	(1916).	
 bridges,	construction	of	fortifications,	and	service	in	the	militia.37		Because	each	community	
was	understood	to	have	a	duty	to	keep	thoroughfares	within	its	boundaries	in	good	repair,	
the	obligation	of	each	member	of	the	community	to	provide	labor	without	compensation	to	
maintain	roads	was	“part	of	the	duty	which	he	owes	to	the	public.”38	
A	strand	of	case	law	regarding	citizenship‐linked	duties	also	exists	in	public‐schooling	
cases.	 	 Courts	 have	 upheld	 truancy	 laws	 that	 punished	 parents	 who	 did	 not	 send	 their	
children	 to	 school	 on	 the	 understanding	 that	 public	 schools	 were	 “not	 so	 much	 a	 right	
granted	 to	 the	 pupils	 as	 a	 duty	 imposed	 upon	 them	 for	 the	 public	 good”39	 and	 a	 “guard	
against	the	dangers	of	‘incompetent	citizenship.’”40		The	concept	of	education	as	an	appro‐
priate—and	indeed	enforceable—obligation	of	citizenship	has	endured.41	
Beyond	this	handful	of	loosely	related	examples,	however,	there	is	considerable	muddi‐
ness	about	precisely	which	obligations	are	understood	to	constitute	duties	of	citizenship	or	
what	unifying	rationale	they	share.		The	parties	challenging	the	constitutionality	of	PPACA	
have	 used	 this	 lack	 of	 clarity	 to	 argue	 for	 the	 narrowest	 understanding	 of	 citizenship	
norms.		The	word	“draft”	recurs	in	the	debates	over	the	individual	mandate,42	for	example,	
and	 is	used	to	delineate	 the	sharp	contrast	 that	conservatives	see	between	PPACA’s	 indi‐
 
37 Id.	at	330‐31	(citing	1	William	Blackstone,	Commentaries	*357)	
38 Id.	at	330.	39 Fogg	v.	Bd.	of	Educ.,	82	A.	173,	175	(N.H.	1912).	
40 Id.;	see	also	State	v.	Hoyt,	146	A.	170,	171	(N.H.	1929)	(relying	on	Fogg	for	the	proposition	that	requiring	children	to	at‐
tend	school	betters	society	as	a	whole).	
41 See,	e.g.,	Wisconsin	v.	Yoder,	406	U.S.	205,	221	(1972)	(referring	to	education	as	a	“general	obligation	of	citizenship”);	
Robinson	v.	Cahill,	303	A.2d	273,	297	(N.J.	1973)	(finding	that	a	system	of	school	financing	leading	to	disparate	funding	across	
schools	violated	the	state’s	obligation	to	provide	an	adequate	public	school	system).	42 For	example,	the	Virginia	Attorney	General	Kenneth	Cuccinelli,	a	plaintiff	in	one	of	the	challenges,	argued,	“This	law‐
suit	is	not	about	health	care,	it’s	about	our	freedom	.	.	.	.	The	government	cannot	draft	an	unwilling	citizen	into	commerce	just	
so	 it	can	regulate	him	under	the	Commerce	Clause.”	 	David	M.	Drucker,	Virginia	 Judge	Allows	Health	Care	Challenge	to	Pro‐
ceed,	 Roll	 Call	 (Aug.	 2,	 2010,	 1:40	 PM),	 http://www.rollcall.com/news/48911‐1.html;	 see	 also	 Matt	 Sissel,	 Health‐Care	
Reform:		Why	I’m	Suing	to	Get	Back	My	Freedom,	Christian	Sci.	Monitor,	Sept.	13,	2010,	available	at	2010	WLNR	18185542	
(“I	object	to	being	conscripted	into	a	federal	health‐care	program	.	.	.	.”).	
  
vidual	mandate	and	those	demands,	such	as	Selective	Service,	that	they	do	consider	to	be	
indisputable	obligations	of	citizenship.	 	As	 the	Cato	Institute	argued	 in	 its	amicus	brief	 in	
the	Virginia	case,	“To	be	sure,	there	are	exceptional	situations	in	which	the	federal	govern‐
ment	may	mandate	individual	activity	.	.	.	[for	example,	the	draft,	jury	duty,	and	payment	of	
income	tax].	 	But	 these	duties	go	to	the	heart	of	American	citizenship.”43	 	Similarly,	 three	
former	Attorneys	General	of	the	United	States	argued	in	the	same	case	that	“the	broad	po‐
lice	power	of	 the	 States	did	.	.	.	include	 some	authority	 to	 require	 affirmative	 action—but	
the	duty	was	of	the	citizen	to	the	state	and	was	rooted	in	tradition.”44		In	both	instances,	the	
authors	of	the	briefs	apparently	believed	that	to	state	the	distinction	between	the	duties	of	
citizenship	and	the	obligation	to	join	a	national	social	insurance	system	was	to	prove	it.	
Whether	access	to	health	care	(via	health	insurance)	is	a	right	has	long	been	the	master	
frame	of	social	justice	debates	in	the	realm	of	health.	 	I	would	have	predicted	that	the	na‐
tional	debates	following	enactment	of	a	broad	health	reform	law	would	have	focused	on	the	
extent	of	newly	created	rights.	 	What	is	remarkable	about	the	discourse	that	has	emerged	
from	the	constitutional	challenges	to	PPACA	so	far	is	the	extent	to	which	its	master	frame	is	
over	the	proper	scope	of	the	individual’s	obligations.	
 
43 Memorandum	of	the	Cato	Inst.	et	al.	as	Amici	Curiae	Supporting	Plaintiff’s	Opposition	to	Defendant’s	Motion	to	Dismiss	at	
13,	Virginia	ex	rel.	Cuccinelli	v.	Sebelius,	702	F.	Supp.	2d	768	(E.D.	Va.	2010)(No.	10‐0188)	[hereinafter	Memorandum	of	the	Cato	
Inst.	et	al.].	
44 Memorandum	of	Amici	Curiae,	Former	United	States	Attorneys	General	William	Barr,	et	al.,	in	Support	of	Plaintiff’s	Mo‐
tion	for	Summary	Judgment	at	17‐18,	Cuccinelli,	728	F.	Supp.	2d	768	(No.	10‐0188).	
 B.		Participation	Rights	and	Citizen	Consumers	
Traditional	approaches	to	citizenship,	such	as	Marshall’s,	have	engaged	only	questions	
of	the	individual’s	relationship	to	the	state.		The	perspective	of	citizenship	as	a	social	role,	
however,	opens	up	a	broader	view	that	can	take	a	more	functional	approach	to	citizenship	
practices.		One	such	function	centers	on	participation,	an	element	not	necessarily	limited	to	
the	state	or	to	purely	public	institutions.	
Thomas	Janoski	has	argued	that	participation	rights	form	a	fourth	category,	in	addition	
to	Marshall’s	typology,	of	the	incidents	of	citizenship.45		Janoski	defines	participation	rights	
as	 “individual	 and	 group	 rights	 to	 participate	 in	 private	 decision	 making	 through	 some	
measure	of	control	over	markets,	organizations,	and	capital,”	with	most	of	his	examples	fo‐
cused	on	workers	and	labor	unions.46	
PPACA	creates	new	opportunities	for	effectuation	of	a	participation	right	outside	gov‐
ernment,	not	 in	 the	employment	 context	but	 in	 the	potential	 for	 the	 role	of	 consumer	 to	
overlap	with	that	of	citizen.		The	border	between	being	a	citizen	and	being	a	consumer	is	es‐
pecially	porous	 in	the	health	care	system.47	 	A	deep	public‐private	dual	 identity	permeates	
PPACA’s	structure,	just	as	it	has	long	been	pervasive	in	the	health	care	system;	the	individual	
mandate’s	command	to	purchase	insurance	products	on	the	private	market	is	one	of	count‐
less	examples	of	 its	manifestation.	 	A	correlative	right	of	participation	should	be	viewed	as	
reciprocal	to	the	individual’s	obligation	to	purchase	insurance.	
 
45 See	Janoski,	supra	note	22,	at	28‐33	(arguing	that	most	theorists	have	failed	to	recognize	participation	rights).		
46 Id.	at	32.	
47 Cf.	Nan	D.	Hunter,	Rights	Talk	and	Patient	Subjectivity:	 	The	Role	of	Autonomy,	Equality,	and	Participation	Norms,	45	
Wake	Forest	L.	Rev.	1525,	1545‐47	(2010)	(“[T]he	American	health	care	system	is	being	actively	reshaped	by	the	expectations	
of	consumers	and	consumer‐centric	financial	incentives.”	(citations	and	internal	quotation	marks	omitted)).	
  
New	scholarship,	primarily	in	history,	has	sought	to	recuperate	the	idea	that	consumer	
experiences	can	enhance	the	potential	for	greater	involvement	in	political	activities	and	for	
strengthening	of	democratic	values.	 	The	work	of	Lizabeth	Cohen	especially	suggests	that	
“citizen”	and	“consumer”	are	not	necessarily	an	antithetical,	dichotomous,	or	mutually	ex‐
clusive	pairing	in	American	politics.48		Cohen’s	work	has	excavated	a	progressive	“consum‐
er	citizen”	identity	that	flowered	during	the	New	Deal.49	
Government	 officials	 during	 the	 Roosevelt	 administration	 sought	 both	 to	 strengthen	
and	 to	draw	strength	 from	national	consumer	organizations,	declaring	 that	a	governance	
role	 for	 consumers	would	 “put	 the	market	power	of	 the	 consumer	 to	work	politically.”50		
Presidential	speeches	validated	the	right	of	consumers	“to	have	their	interests	represented	
in	the	formulation	of	government	policy.”51		Formal	bodies	for	direct	consumer	representa‐
tion	 were	 established	 within	 the	 National	 Recovery	 Administration	 (NRA),	 the	 Office	 of	
Price	Administration	(OPA)	(during	World	War	II),	the	Tennessee	Valley	Authority,	and	the	
Rural	 Electrification	Administration.52	 	 Both	 the	NRA	 and	 the	OPA	 set	 up	 state	 and	 local	
consumer	 advisory	 groups	 as	well.53	 	 This	 focus	 on	 active	 participation	 built	 on	 and	 ex‐
panded	 the	 notion	 of	 consumer	 politics	 developed	 during	 the	 Progressive	 Era,	when	 re‐
 
48 See	Lizabeth	Cohen,	A	Consumers’	Republic:	 	The	Politics	of	Mass	Consumption	 in	Postwar	America	 8	 (2003)	
(“[C]itizen	and	consumer	were	ever‐shifting	categories	that	sometimes	overlapped,	often	were	in	tension,	but	always	reflected	
the	permeability	of	the	political	and	economic	spheres.”);	see	also	T.H.	Breen,	The	Marketplace	of	Revolution:		How	Consum‐
er	Politics	Shaped	American	Independence,	at	XV‐XVII	(2004)	(arguing	that	the	consumer	experiences	of	colonists	helped	fa‐
cilitate	mobilization	for	the	American	Revolution).	
49 See	Cohen,	supra	note	48,	at	23‐37,	66‐112	(describing	the	New	Deal’s	“growing	attentiveness	to	consumers	as	a	way	
of	.	.	.	protecting	.	.	.	the	public	interest”).	
50 Id.	at	8.	51 Id.	at	30	(internal	citations	omitted).	
52 Id.	at	28‐31,	66‐67.	
53 Id.	at	66‐67.	
 forms	were	enacted	to	protect	purchasers	from	tainted	products,	but	consumer	represent‐
atives	did	not	join	decisionmaking	bodies.54	
Cohen	argues	that	the	consumer‐citizen	framework	emerged	during	the	1930s	as	a	po‐
litically	 “acceptable	way	of	promoting	 the	public	good”	without	 invoking	overtly	 socialist	
rhetoric,	 and	 as	 a	 tactic	 for	melding	 democratic	 values	with	 the	 preservation	 of	 capital‐
ism.55		Both	of	these	objectives	resonate	with	the	political	history	of	PPACA	as	well.		What	
Tom	Baker	describes	elsewhere	in	this	volume	as	the	trade‐off	in	PPACA	between	social	so‐
lidarity	 and	 the	 insurance	 law	 precept	 of	 fair	 (i.e.,	 actuarially	 justified)	 discrimination56	
speaks	to	the	same	perceived	political	need	to	balance	themes	of	collective	responsibility	
with	those	of	individualism	that	Cohen	discerned	in	the	New	Deal.	
A	note	of	caution	is	in	order.	 	I	do	not	mean	to	overstate	the	progressive	potential	for	
consumer	citizen	politics.	 	Access	to	health	care	in	the	United	States	has	long	turned	on	a	
bargained‐for	 form	of	 “belonging”	 to	what	 is	 typically	a	private	market	 risk	pool	without	
any	meaningful	accompanying	rights.57		On	this	view,	the	political	relationship	of	individu‐
als	to	the	American	health	care	system	illustrates	what	Margaret	Somers	has	described	as	
 
54 See	id.	at	21‐23	(describing	the	efforts	to	organize	consumer	advocacy	groups	and	to	pass	legislation	in	the	early	1900s).	
55 Id.	at	23.	
56 Tom	Baker,	Health	Insurance,	Risk,	and	Responsibility	after	the	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act,	159	U.	Pa.	L.	
Rev.	XX,	XX	(2011)	(“[T]he	[PPACA]	extends	the	fair	share	approach	to	health	care	financing	by	bringing	more	people	under	the	
health	insurance	umbrella.		At	the	same	time,	the	Act	extends	the	nondiscrimination	vision	of	what	constitutes	a	fair	share	from	
the	large‐group	market	into	the	individual	and	small‐group	market.”).	57 Since	1974,	 the	Employee	Retirement	 Insurance	Security	Act	 (ERISA),	29	U.S.C.	 §§	1001–1461	 (2006),	has	dominated	
regulation	of	the	biggest	chunk	of	the	health	insurance	market	employer‐sponsored	plans.		ERISA	does	not	require	employers	to	
offer	health	benefits,	nor	does	it	offer	any	correlative	right	of	employees	to	gain	access	to	coverage.		Generally,	the	terms	of	ERISA	
have	been	interpreted	to	limit	liability	to	plans	should	employers	breach	contracts	with	their	employee	enrollees.	See,	e.g.,	Ka‐
therine	L.	Record,	Note,	Wielding	the	Wand	Without	Facing	the	Music:		Allowing	Utilization	Review	Physicians	to	Trump	Doctors’	
Orders,	but	Protecting	Them	from	the	Legal	Risk	Ordinarily	Attached	to	the	Medical	Degree,	59	Duke	L.J.	955,	967	(2010)	(noting	
that	ERISA	allows	recovery	of	benefits	denied	but	not	compensatory	or	punitive	damages—a	remedies	system	that	was	created	for	
breach	of	pension).		ERISA	frames	the	bulk	of	American	health	insurance	as	a	voluntaristic	auxiliary	in	a	broader	free	market	sys‐
tem.		Id.		It	narrowly	protects	contractual	benefits,	and	has	been	interpreted	to	preempt	any	claim	relating	to	a	plan	that	would	col‐
lect	further	damages	(e.g.,	state	law	claims	of	negligence,	emotional	distress,	wrongful	death,	medical	malpractice,	and	bad	faith).		
Id.	at	968	n.63.		Under	ERISA,	the	“citizen”	is	a	utility	maximizing	rational	actor	entitled	to	the	protection	of	a	state	apparatus	for	
her	bargained‐for	deserts.	
  
only	a	 thin	 form	of	 “contractualized”	 citizenship.58	 	This	kind	of	 link	between	 citizenship	
and	consumer	activities	points	 to	an	understanding	of	 governance	as	 stakeholder	plural‐
ism,	 rather	 than	as	a	 reinforcement	of	 social	 solidarity	norms.	 	Consistent	with	 that	 con‐
cern,	the	normative	values	associated	with	a	contract‐based	understanding	of	citizenship	in	
the	 health	 care	 system	 speak	 less	 to	 social	 solidarity	 than	 to	 the	 individual’s	 capacity	 to	
identify	 and	 purchase	 coverage	 that	will	most	 closely	match	 her	 cost	 and	 quality	 prefe‐
rences.59	
However,	 it	would	also	be	a	mistake	 to	dismiss	entirely	 the	potential	 for	mobilization	
that	attends	participation	in	market‐oriented	activities	and	practices.	The	experience	of	con‐
sumer	citizenship	in	the	1930s	succeeded	in	two	key	respects	important	for	a	project	linked	
to	progressive	values:		democratic	norms	and	practices	reached	federal,	state,	and	local	levels	
of	governance,	and	the	resulting	institutions	went	beyond	representation	of	consumer	inter‐
ests	 to	 the	 establishment	of	 systems	 for	 consumer	participation	 in	 policymaking.	 	 Cohen’s	
work	demonstrates	that	the	participatory	mechanisms	for	consumers	during	the	New	Deal	
did	not	exist	simply	as	rote	formalities,	but	that	citizen	consumers	were	genuinely	engaged	in	
that	effort	as	well.60		This	history	of	broadly	diffused	engagement	suggests	that	social	insur‐
ance	programs,	including	PPACA,	could	produce	effective	venues	for	citizenship	practices.	
 
58 See	Somers,	 supra	note	22,	 at	 2‐3,	 68‐73	 (arguing	 that	 contractual	 citizenship	 creates	 groups	of	 citizens	who	 are	 in‐
cluded	in	the	accompanying	rights	and	groups	who	are	excluded).	
59 It	is	not	surprising,	for	example,	that	PPACA	itself	contains	the	term	“educated	health	care	consumer,”	defined	as	“an	in‐
dividual	who	is	knowledgeable	about	the	health	care	system,	and	has	background	or	experience	in	making	informed	decisions	
regarding	health,	medical,	and	scientific	matters.”		PPACA	§	10104(d),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18024(e)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010).	
60 See	Cohen,	supra	note	48,	at	29‐31,	34.	
 C.		Social	Security	
When	analyzing	an	American	social	 insurance	scheme,	the	inevitable	comparison	is	to	
Social	Security,	which	obligates	each	working	individual	to	pay	a	dedicated	tax	to	support	
the	program.61	 	Although	now	a	universal	 system,	Social	Security	originated	as	a	poverty‐
amelioration	program,	in	which	Congress	silently	perpetuated	gender,	race,	and	income	in‐
equalities.62		It	was	only	over	time	that	the	Social	Security	Act	“established	American	social	
citizenship.”63	
Similarly	to	PPACA,	the	threshold	legal	challenge	to	Social	Security	focused	on	the	con‐
stitutionality	of	 its	 financing	component,	which,	unlike	 the	 individual	mandate	 in	PPACA,	
was	 clearly	 structured	 as	 a	 tax.64	 	 The	Court	 found	 the	 Social	 Security	Act	 constitutional	
pursuant	 to	 Congress’s	 taxing	 power,	 without	 having	 to	 consider	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Com‐
merce	Clause.65		Yet	the	logic	of	the	challenge	nonetheless	parallels	the	political	arguments	
 
61 42	U.S.C.	§	301	(2006).		Various	taxes	enacted	under	the	Federal	Insurance	Contributions	Act	finance	the	Social	Security	
program.		26	U.S.C.	§	3101(a)(2006).		
62 Social	Security	was	originally	divided	between	benefits—framed	as	earnings	from	worker	contributions—and	assistance	
to	 the	needy.	 	 See	Suzanne	Mettler,	Dividing	Citizens:	 	Gender	and	Federalism	 in	New	Deal	Public	Policy	55‐59	 (1998)	
(chronicling	 the	evolution	of	 ideas	on	how	to	 implement	 the	Social	Security	system).	 	Moreover,	 the	system	 initially	excluded	
agricultural	and	domestic	workers,	thus	eliminating	coverage	for	half	of	the	African‐American	population	at	that	time.		See	Jennifer	
Klein,	For	All	These	Rights:		Business,	Labor	and	the	Shaping	of	America’s	Public‐Private	Welfare	State	104	(2003)	(noting	
that	bifurcating	Social	Security	directly	resulted	in	the	exclusion	of	several	groups,	including	African‐Americans).		
63 Mettler,	supra	note	62,	at	54.		In	1939,	Congress	expanded	Social	Security	to	allow	benefits	greater	than	the	amount	that	
the	deceased	worker	had	paid	 in,	 thus	moving	away	 from	a	“contributory‐contractual	principle”	 to	a	genuine	social	 insurance	
model,	in	which	government	assumed	the	employee’s	responsibility	to	his	family	by	providing	income	security.		Brian	R.	Gross‐
man	et	al.,	One	Nation,	Interdependent:		Exploring	the	Boundaries	of	Citizenship	in	the	History	of	Social	Security	and	Medicare,	in	
Leah	Rogne	et	al.,	Social	Insurance	and	Social	Justice:		Social	Security,	Medicare,	and	the	Campaign	Against	Entitlements	
115,	127	(2009).	64 Then–Secretary	of	Labor	Frances	Perkins	credited	the	clarity	of	constitutional	authority	for	Social	Security	to	advice	she	
received	in	1934	from	Chief	Justice	Harlan	Stone:		“The	taxing	power,	my	dear,	the	taxing	power.		You	can	do	anything	under	the	
taxing	power.”		Francis	Perkins,	Sec’y	of	Labor,	Speech	at	the	Social	Security	Administration:		The	Roots	of	Social	Security	(Oct.	
23,	 1962),	 available	 at	 http://www.ssa.gov/	
history/perkins5.html.		65 Helvering	v.	Davis,	301	U.S.	619,	640‐41	(1937).		The	Supreme	Court	left	open	the	question	of	the	constitutionality	of	the	
tax	on	individual	employees,	limiting	its	holding	to	the	claims	brought	by	employers.		See	id.	at	645	(stating	only	that	the	tax	on	
employers	was	valid).		Plaintiffs	in	the	challenges	to	PPACA	accept	the	Social	Security	tax	as	a	constitutionally	legitimate	exercise	
of	congressional	taxing	power,	but	argue	that	Helvering	provides	no	support	for	PPACA	because	PPACA	is	financed	by	a	mandate	
to	purchase	a	private	commodity,	rather	than	to	pay	monies	to	the	government.	 	See,	e.g.,	Memorandum	of	the	Cato	Inst.	et	al.,	
supra	note	43,	at	19	(“Although	the	term	‘excise’	now	covers	virtually	every	internal	revenue	tax	except	the	income	tax,	the	indi‐
  
being	made	against	PPACA,	and	the	Court’s	reasoning	in	response	implies	the	kind	of	civic	
solidarity	 justification	 that	 could	be	mounted	 to	defend	 the	new	 law	 in	non‐doctrinal	ar‐
guments.	
In	the	Social	Security	case,	the	First	Circuit	had	ruled	the	Act	unconstitutional	as	a	viola‐
tion	of	the	Tenth	Amendment,	on	the	ground	that	providing	assistance	to	the	elderly	and	
poor	was	a	power	reserved	to	the	states	and	not	legitimately	within	Congressional	authori‐
ty.66		Moreover,	it	found	that	“a	tax	imposed	to	benefit	slightly	over	half	of	the	people	over	
sixty‐five	years	of	age	and	who	are	the	care	or	burden	of	the	states	cannot	be	said	to	be	im‐
posed	for	the	general	welfare	of	the	United	States.”67	
Justice	Cardozo’s	opinion	for	the	Supreme	Court	reasoned	that	although	“Congress	may	
spend	money	in	aid	of	the	‘general	welfare[,]’	.	.	.	[t]he	line	must	still	be	drawn	between	one	
welfare	and	another,	between	particular	and	general.”68		The	Court	rejected	a	“static”	con‐
cept	of	the	general	welfare:		“Needs	that	were	narrow	or	parochial	a	century	ago	may	be	in‐
terwoven	in	our	day	with	the	well‐being	of	the	Nation.		What	is	critical	or	urgent	changes	
with	the	times.”69		The	Court	also	found	the	new	system	to	be	an	appropriate	response	to	
urgent	need:	
 
vidual	mandate	penalty	(unlike	Social	Security)	is	not	a	tax	on	employment	or	other	action—it	‘taxes’	inaction.”).		
66 Davis	v.	Edison	Elec.	Illuminated	Co.	of	Bos.,	89	F.2d	393,	395	(1st	Cir.	1937),	rev’d	sub	nom.	Helvering	v.	Davis,	301	U.S.	
619	(1937).	
67 Id.	at	395.	
68 Helvering,	301	U.S.	at	640	(citing	U.S.	Const.	art.	I,	§	8,	and	United	States	v.	Butler,	297	U.S.	1,	65	(1936)).	
69 Id.	at	641.	
 Spreading	 from	 State	 to	 State,	 unemployment	 is	 an	 ill	 not	 particular	 but	 general,	
which	 may	 be	 checked,	 if	 Congress	 so	 determines,	 by	 the	 resources	 of	 the	 Na‐
tion	.	.	.	.	[Nation‐wide	harm	 results	 regardless	 of]	whether	men	 are	 thrown	out	 of	
work	because	there	is	no	longer	work	to	do	or	because	the	disabilities	of	age	make	
them	incapable	of	doing	it.		Rescue	becomes	necessary	irrespective	of	the	cause.70	
These	passages	 in	Helvering	performed	significant	work	 in	 the	Social	 Security	debate	
and	are	extraordinarily	rich	for	present	purposes	as	well.		The	Court	invokes	the	norms	of	
reciprocal	and	collective	responsibility—“rescue”—that	comprise	the	ethos	of	citizenship.		
Further,	 Justice	 Cardozo	 uses	 the	 language	 of	 emergency—a	 “nation‐wide	 calamity	.	.	.	
[s]preading	from	State	to	State”71—to	ground	the	necessity	for	collective	mobilization	of	the	
sort	associated	with	self‐defense	and	national	security.		The	opinion	frames	the	threat	as	one	
to	the	nation	as	a	whole,	requiring	a	specifically	national	response,	warning	of	the	hazards	of	
relying	on	multiple	state	old‐age	pension	systems,	and	cautioning	that	“[o]nly	a	power	that	is	
national	can	serve	the	interests	of	all.”72	
Today,	paying	Social	Security	taxes	is	rarely	questioned	as	falling	outside	an	American’s	
reasonable	 expectation	 of	 the	 obligations	 of		
citizenship,	 even	 though	 Social	 Security	 is	 certainly	 not	 essential	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 any	
government.		Yet	the	program	functions	as	an	institution	or	technology	of	societal	solidari‐
ty	at	a	sufficiently	deep	level	that	it	constitutes	part	of	the	social	meaning	of	citizenship.	
 
70 Id.	
71 Id.	
72 Id.	at	644.	
  
Indeed,	political	scientist	Angela	Campbell,	who	has	studied	Social	Security	extensively,	
concludes	that	it	has	been	a	major	factor	in	making	seniors	the	“[ü]ber‐citizens”	of	Ameri‐
can	politics.73		On	other	political	issues,	senior	engagement	is	no	higher	than	that	of	other	
persons;	it	is	the	specific	interest	in	Social	Security	that	has	led	to	a	relatively	larger	politi‐
cal	presence	for	that	demographic	group.74		Campbell	credits	program	design	and	adminis‐
tration,	as	well	as	financial	support	provided	by	the	benefits,	with	having	created	the	con‐
ditions	that	have	produced	this	result.75		Most	impressively,	Social	Security	has	produced	a	
phenomenon	 in	 which	 low‐income	 beneficiaries	 have	 become	 more	 active	 than	
high‐income	seniors	on	issues	specific	to	Social	Security.76	
Engagement	by	participants	has	 led,	 in	 turn,	 to	modifications	 that	have	expanded	 the	
scope	of	the	program.77		Social	Security	created	an	identifiable	constituency	group	that	at‐
tracted	 interest‐group	entrepreneurs	and	political	parties,	who	 in	 turn	mobilized	greater	
levels	 of	 engagement	 by	 program	 enrollees,	who	 themselves	 identified	 gaps	 in	 coverage	
that	 require	 additional	 political	 action.78	 	 This	 process	 effectively	 transformed	 the	
low‐income	elderly—a	socially	anonymous	and	diffuse	group—into	a	political	power	base	
that	became	politically	legible	as	discrete	and	organized,	even	while	remaining	diffuse.79	
 
73 Andrea	Louise	Campbell,	How	Policies	Make	Citizens:		Senior	Political	Activism	and	the	American	Welfare	State	2	
(2003).	
74 See	id.	at	48	(“[S]eniors’	general	political	engagement	is	not	higher	than	that	of	nonseniors.”).	
75 Id.	at	136.	
76 Id.	at	39.	77 Id.	at	92.	
78 Id.	at	77.	
79 Id.	at	112‐14.	
 The	examples	of	Social	Security	and	New	Deal	 citizen	consumer	 institutions	 illustrate	
the	power	of	 law	to	shape	cognition	and	understanding	in	situations	in	which	meaning	is	
ambiguous	and	malleable.		Social	insurance	programs	can	redefine	concrete	reality	and,	in	
the	process,	alter	popular	expectations	of	what	are	appropriate	attitudes	and	behaviors.	
II.		The	Individual	Mandate	as	Linchpin	and	Signifier	
A	robust	debate	about	the	obligations	of	citizenship	has	emerged	as	part	of	the	political	
discourse	 surrounding	 constitutional	 challenges	 to	 PPACA.	 	 In	 this	 Part,	 I	 describe	 the	
structural	and	symbolic	importance	of	the	individual	mandate	to	the	overall	reform	effort	
and	to	the	citizenship‐linked	meanings	of	the	legislation.	 	Although	the	provision	creating	
the	individual	mandate	accounted	for	much	of	the	resistance	to	the	bill,	its	proponents	in‐
sisted	on	its	inclusion	as	the	cornerstone	of	the	legislation	because	it	provided	a	mechan‐
ism	to	address	a	dysfunctional	insurance	market.80	
On	the	surface,	the	litigation	over	whether	it	is	constitutional	to	require	individuals	to	
purchase	health	insurance	policies	concerns	the	scope	of	the	Commerce	and	the	Necessary	
and	Proper	Clauses,	as	well	as	the	applicability	of	the	taxing	power.		In	the	subtext	to	those	
arguments	are	the	radically	different	visions	of	the	meaning	of	the	social	obligations	of	citi‐
zenship	that	are	fueling	popular	understandings	and	debates	over	the	social	meaning	of	the	
new	law.	
 
80 See,	e.g.,	Press	Release,	House	Comm.	on	Ways	and	Means,	Health	Reform	in	the	21st	Century:		Insurance	Market	Reforms	
(Apr.	15,	2009)	(quoting	Ways	and	Means	Committee	Chairman	Charles	Rangel	as	saying	that	“America’s	health	insurance	mar‐
ket	is	dysfunctional,”	evidenced	by	“the	87	million	people	who	went	without	health	insurance	during	the	past	two	years	and	the	
millions	more	who	have	insurance	that	is	increasingly	unaffordable	or	inadequate”).	
  
A.		Economic	Necessity	
In	the	years	leading	up	to	the	enactment	of	PPACA,	two	economic	dynamics	dominated	
the	health	 insurance	market:	 	prohibitive	cost	 (with	premiums	 increasing	at	a	 faster	rate	
than	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 in	 income)	 and	 decreasing	 participation	 (forty‐six	million	 unin‐
sured	in	2007,	with	one	in	four	households	forgoing	necessary	medical	care	due	to	cost).81		
Expanding	 access	 to	 coverage	 required	 reforming	 two	profit‐boosting	 strategies	 that	 un‐
derlay	 these	 problems:	 	 medical	 underwriting	 and	 discrimination	 based	 on	 preexisting	
conditions.		The	mandate	was	essential	to	PPACA’s	structure	for	tightening	regulatory	con‐
trol	without	abandoning	a	market‐based	health	insurance	system.	
Medical	underwriting—structuring	premiums	inversely	with	health	status—created	an	
insurance	landscape	that	made	coverage	increasingly	unaffordable	to	those	most	likely	to	
need	care.	 	Thus,	 to	expand	coverage	to	the	sickest	Americans,	Congress	had	to	eliminate	
underwriting	and	require	insurers	to	adhere	to	community‐rated	premiums	(e.g.,	to	charge	
all	beneficiaries	with	the	same	premium,	subject	only	to	age	variation).82		In	doing	so,	Con‐
gress	sought	not	only	to	increase	affordability	of	coverage,	but	also	to	incentivize	insurers	
 
81 Id.	82 See	Health	Reform	 in	 the	21st	Century:	 	 Insurance	Market	Reforms:	 	Hearing	Before	 the	H.	Comm.	on	Ways	and	Means,	
111th	Cong.	13	(2009)	(statement	of	Uwe	E.	Reinhardt,	Professor,	Princeton	University)	(noting	that	health	care	will	never	be	avail‐
able	 to	 “all	Americans	on	equal	 terms”	as	 long	as	 insurance	companies	practiced	underwriting,	and	advocating	community‐rated	
premiums	 instead),	 available	 at	 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/	
cgi‐bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:52258.pdf.	
 to	design	and	implement	effective	cost‐containment	strategies,	thereby	controlling	growth	
in	national	health	care	expenditures.83	
Discrimination	based	on	pre‐existing	 conditions	 (e.g.,	 denying	or	 rescinding	 coverage	
for	 health	 conditions	 pre‐dating	 policy	 enrollment)	 had	 shut	 off	 access	 to	 insurance	 for	
many	patients	 in	 immediate	need	of	 care.	 	To	 facilitate	coverage	of	high‐cost	health	 care	
services,	Congress	required	insurers	to	offer	guaranteed	issue	and	guaranteed	renewal	of	
coverage,	and	limited	insurers’	ability	to	mask	unexpected	exclusions	of	coverage	in	cum‐
bersome	 contracts.84	 In	 addition,	 Congress	 required	 coverage	 of	 “essential	 benefits,”	 and	
restricted	 the	 cost‐sharing	 arrangements	 that	 had	 discouraged	 individuals	 from	 seeking	
preventive	care	before	becoming	ill.85	
The	purpose	of	prohibiting	medical	underwriting	and	discrimination	based	on	preexisting	
conditions	was	to	open	the	insurance	market	to	individuals	of	all	health	statuses,	thereby	ex‐
panding	 coverage	 to	 many	 of	 those	 in	 greatest	 need.	 	 Yet	 requiring	 insurers	 to	 take	 on	
high‐risk	beneficiaries	at	lower	cost—without	mandating	that	healthy	individuals	join	insur‐
 
83 Only	one	percent	of	patients	account	for	more	than	one	quarter	of	health	care	spending,	with	five	percent	accounting	for	
approximately	half.		Samuel	H.	Zuvekas	&	Joel	W.	Cohen,	Prescription	Drugs	and	the	Changing	Concentration	of	Health	Care	Ex‐
penditures,	26	Health	Aff.	249,	251	exhibit	2	(2007).		This	trend	remained	consistent	even	through	the	managed	care	movement	
of	the	1990s,	suggesting	that	insurers	were	not	designing	effective	cost‐containment	policies	that	would	constrain	national	med‐
ical	expenditures.		Id.	at	249‐50;	see	also	The	Tri‐Committee	Draft	Proposal	for	Health	Care	Reform,	Hearing	Before	the	H.	Comm.	on	
Educ.	and	Labor,	111th	Cong.	72	(2009)	(statement	of	Jacob	Hacker,	Co‐Director,	Berkeley	School	of	Law	Center	on	Health	Economic	
&	Family	Security)	(explaining	how	insurance	markets	compete	for	the	lowest‐risk	enrollees	rather	than	price	or	quality	of	care),	
available	 at	 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi‐bin/	
getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:50479.pdf.	
84 PPACA	sec.	1201,	§§	2702–2703,	42	U.S.C.A.	§§	300gg‐1	to	‐2	(West	Supp.	1A	2010).	
85 An	essential	benefits	package,	to	be	defined	by	the	Secretary	of	Health	and	Human	Services,	will	establish	the	minimal	
amount	of	benefits	a	plan	may	offer	on	the	exchange.		Id.	§	1302(b)(1),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18022(b)(1)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010).		In	addi‐
tion,	plans	sold	on	the	exchange	must	cover	at	least	sixty	percent	of	health	care	costs,	id.	§	1302(d)(1),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18022(d)(1),	
and	out‐of‐pocket	expenditures	may	not	exceed	$5,000	 for	an	 individual	or	$10,000	 for	a	 family.	 Id.	§	1302(c)(1),	42	U.S.C.A.	 §	
18022(c)(1).		Section	1001	of	the	Act	also	amends	the	Public	Health	Services	Act	to	prohibit	cost	sharing	for	evidence‐based	pre‐
ventive	services.		Id.	§	1001,	42	U.S.C.A.	300gg‐13(a)	(West	Supp.	1A	2010).	
  
ance	pools—would	have	killed	 the	private	market	by	simultaneously	reducing	premium	in‐
come	and	increasing	expenditures.86	
State‐based	 reforms	had	demonstrated	 this	effect.	 	 For	example,	Congress	 considered	
the	 experience	 of	 New	 Jersey’s	 Individual	 Health	 Coverage	 Program	 of	 1993,	 which	 re‐
quired	 insurers	 to	 use	 guaranteed	 issue	 and	 community‐based	 ratings	 on	 the	 individual	
market,	but	did	not	require	uninsured	residents	to	obtain	coverage.87		Within	a	decade,	the	
state’s	insurance	market	began	to	flounder,	as	the	proportion	of	high‐risk	to	low‐risk	bene‐
ficiaries	increased.88		By	failing	to	require	healthy	individuals	to	purchase	insurance	before	
they	fall	ill,	and	securing	affordable	rates	for	people	of	all	health	statuses,	the	law	incenti‐
vized	free	riding	and	prohibited	insurers	from	minimizing	adverse	selection.89		In	contrast	
to	 the	New	 Jersey	experience,	health	 reform	 in	Massachusetts	demonstrated	 the	stability	
that	an	 individual	mandate	 can	bring	 to	 risk	pooling.	 	Within	 three	years	of	 imposing	 its	
mandate,	 Massachusetts	 experienced	 an	 increase	 in	 insurance	 coverage	 for	 non‐elderly	
adult	from	87.5%	to	95%.90	
 
86 See	Health	Reform	in	the	21st	Century,	supra	note	82,	at	13	(statement	of	Uwe	E.	Reinhardt)	(arguing	that	the	“imposition	of	
community‐rate	premiums	and	guaranteed	issue	on	a	market	of	competing	private	insurers	will	inexorably	drive	that	market	into	ex‐
tinction”).	
87 See	id.	at	13	n.4	(citing	Alan	C.	Monheit	et	al.,	Community	Rating	and	Sustainable	Individual	Health	Insurance	Markets	in	
New	Jersey,	23	Health	Aff.	167	(2004)).		
88 See	 Monheit	 et	 al.,	 supra	 note	 87,	 at	 169	 (describing	 a	 trend	 of	 enrollment	 consistent	 with	 “a	 marketwide	 ad‐
verse‐selection	death	spiral”).		
89 See	id.	(noting	that	insurers	have	been	forced	to	retain	“potentially	adverse	health	risks”).	90 Sharon	K.	Long	&	Karen	Stockley,	Health	Reform	in	Massachusetts:	 	An	Update	as	of	Fall	2009,	at	iii	(2010);	see	
also	PPACA	§	10106(a),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18091(a)(2)(D)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010)	(describing	the	“Effects	on	the	National	Economy	and	
Interstate	Commerce”	of	 the	 individual	mandate	and	stating	 that	 “[i]n	Massachusetts,	a	 similar	 requirement	has	strengthened	
private	employer‐based	coverage:		despite	the	economic	downturn,	the	number	of	workers	offered	employer‐based	coverage	has	
actually	increased.”).			
 Taking	 into	 account	 the	 experience	 of	 state‐based	 insurance	 reform,	 Congress	 used	 a	
mandate	 to	mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	 eliminating	 the	 insurance	 industry’s	 primary	means	 of	
maximizing	profit.91		The	mandate	allows	insurers	to	effectively	pool	risk:		offsetting	the	cost	
of	insuring	high‐risk	beneficiaries	at	affordable	rates	with	the	profits	earned	on	healthy	be‐
neficiaries.92		In	other	words,	the	mandate	eliminates	two	market	failures:		free‐riding	and	
improper	risk	analysis.93	
Congress	 also	 found	 the	mandate	 important	 for	 addressing	 issues	 related	 to	 employ‐
er‐sponsored	coverage:	 	continuity	in	coverage	and	variability	in	plans.	 	In	light	of	the	in‐
crease	 in	 lateral	career	movement,	Congress	concluded	that	a	mandate	would	 incentivize	
employees	to	remain	covered	during	the	transition	between	old	and	new	employer	plans.94		
It	would	also	enhance	the	accessibility	of	coverage	for	the	self‐employed,	unemployed,	or	
underemployed,	 or	 those	 working	 in	 small	 businesses	 that	 lack	 risk‐pooling	 capacity.95		
PPACA	creates	state‐based	health	insurance	exchanges	in	order	to	provide	a	vehicle	for	ob‐
taining	 coverage	 outside	 of	 large	 employer‐sponsored	 or	 public	 plans.96	 	 Without	 the	
mandate,	the	financial	stability	of	the	exchanges	might	falter	under	the	force	of	adverse	se‐
 
91 See	Health	Reform	in	the	21st	Century,	supra	note	82,	at	9,	101‐02	(noting	that	health	reform	in	New	Jersey	resulted	in	
an	unraveling	of	the	insurance	market	due	to	the	lack	of	a	mandate).		
92 See	id.	at	107	(testimony	of	William	Vaughan,	Senior	Policy	Analyst,	Consumers	Union)	(noting	that	a	mandate	removes	the	
business	necessity	of	imposing	limitations	the	coverage	of	on	pre‐existing	conditions);	id.	at	118‐19	(statement	of	the	American	Acad‐
emy	of	Actuaries)	(noting	that	with	larger	risk	pools,	insurers	can	charge	lower	rates).	
93 Representative	Schwartz	discussed	the	problem	of	improper	risk	analysis	seen	in	young	adults	tending	to	underestimate	
the	future	risk	of	accumulating	medical	costs.		Id.	at	106‐07	(statement	of	Rep.	Allyson	Schwartz,	H.	Comm.	on	Ways	and	Means).		
		 94 There	 is	 often	 either	 a	 six‐month	waiting	 period	 to	 enroll	 in	 a	 new	 employer’s	 plan	 or	 an	 annual	 thirty	 to	 sixty	 day	
enrollment	window.		Id.	at	103‐05.	95 See	id.	at	35‐37,	40,	94,	110‐16	(discussing	insurance	barriers	for	those	unable	to	pool	risk).				
96 PPACA	§	1311(b),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(b)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010).	
  
lection.		Thus,	the	primary	role	of	the	individual	mandate	is	to	stabilize	the	private	health	
insurance	market.97	
B.		 A	Signification	Contest	Between	Economic	Liberty	
and	the	Social	Compact	
Lawsuits	 challenging	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 PPACA	 have	 targeted	 the	 individual	
mandate.98		The	resolution	of	these	claims,	almost	certainly	by	the	Supreme	Court,	will	turn	
on	whether	 the	 requirement	 to	 purchase	 health	 insurance	 is	 an	 appropriate	 exercise	 of	
Congressional	power	under	either	the	Commerce	Clause	or	the	taxing	power.		There	seems	
to	be	little	dispute	that	this	precise	form	of	federal	mandate—that	individuals	must	purchase	
certain	private	goods	or	pay	a	penalty—is	unprecedented.99		The	Court’s	resolution	may	de‐
pend	on	whether	the	Justices	calibrate	their	analysis	at	a	greater	or	lesser	level	of	generality,	
by	 deciding	whether	 the	 PPACA	mandate	 is	 a	 reasonable	way	 to	 regulate	 a	 trillion‐dollar	
economic	subsystem	or	whether	it	is	more	like	an	authoritarian	command	that	each	individ‐
 
97 But	the	individual	mandate	will	not	remedy	all	troubles	of	adverse	selection	within	the	insurance	exchanges.		See	Timothy	
Stoltzfus	 Jost,	Commonwealth	Fund,	Health	 Insurance	Exchanges	and	 the	Affordable	Care	Act:	 	Eight	Difficult	 Issues	 9	
(2010)	(describing	how	the	continued	existence	of	a	market	outside	the	exchange	will	leave	open	the	possibility	of	adverse	selec‐
tion).			
98 See	Florida	ex	rel.	Bondi	v.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Health	&	Human	Servs.,	No.	10‐091,	2011	WL	285683	(N.D.	Fla.	Jan.	31,	2011);	
Virginia	ex	rel.	Cuccinelli	v.	Sebelius,	728	F.	Supp.	2d	768	(E.D.	Va.	2010);	New	 Jersey	Physicians,	 Inc.	v.	Obama,	No.	10‐1489,	
2010	WL	5060597	(D.N.J.	Dec.	8,	2010);	Liberty	Univ.	v.	Geithner,	No.	10‐0015,	2010	WL	4860299	(W.D.	Va.	Nov.	30,	2010);	U.S.	
Citizens	Ass’n.	v.	Sebelius,	No.	10‐1065,	2010	WL	4947043	(N.D.	Ohio	Nov.	22,	2010);	Shreeve	v.	Obama,	No.	10‐0071,	2010	WL	
4628177	(E.D.	Tenn.	Nov.	4,	2010);	Florida	ex	rel.	McCollum	v.	U.S.	Dept.	of	Health	&	Human	Servs.,	716	F.	Supp.	2d	1120	(N.D.	
Fla.	2010);	Thomas	More	Law	Ctr.	v.	Obama,	720	F.	Supp.	2d	882	(E.D.	Mich.	2010).		A	number	of	cases	were	also	filed	in	which	
no	court	opinion	had	been	issued	as	of	April	5,	2011.		See	Amended	Complaint,	Bryant	v.	Holder,	No.	10‐0076	(S.D.	Miss.	Mar.	4,	
2011);	Complaint,	Coons	v.	Geithner,	No.	10‐1714	(D.	Ariz.	Aug.	12,	2010);	Complaint,	Calvey	v.	Obama,	No.	10‐0353	(W.D.	Okla.	
Aug.	6,	2010);	Complaint,	Ass’n	of	Am.	Physicians	&	Surgeons	v.	Sebelius,	No.	10‐0499	(D.D.C.	Mar.	26,	2010).		
99 See	McCollum,	 716	F.	 Supp.	 2d	 at	 1164	 (quoting	 a	 1994	CBO	memorandum	determining	 that	 the	 individual	mandate	
would	be	“an	unprecedented	form	of	federal	action”);	see	generally	Jennifer	Staman,	Cong.	Research	Serv.,	R40725,	Requiring	
Individuals	 to	Obtain	Health	 Insurance:	 	A	Constitutional	Analysis	 1	 (Dec.	16,	2010)	 (noting	 that	Congress	has	never	 re‐
quired	the	transfer	of	money	to	private	parties	except	in	return	for	a	privilege,	such	as	driving	cars).	
 ual	must	buy	a	health	club	membership.		In	my	view,	for	reasons	well	stated	by	Mark	Hall,100	
there	is	no	basis	for	the	Court	to	conclude	that	the	Act	is	unconstitutional.	
My	focus	in	this	Article	is	not	on	the	doctrinal	analysis	of	the	debate	that	will	be	before	
the	Supreme	Court	but	on	the	underlying	social	messages	and	meanings	that	are	implicated	
in	that	debate.		In	cultural	terms,	the	Court	will	have	to	decide	whether	PPACA	is	about	pre‐
serving	a	fiscally	and	otherwise	healthy	collectivity—the	nation—or	about	preserving	an	in‐
dividually	defined	bundle	of	rights.		Perhaps	subconsciously,	the	Justices	must	frame	the	rela‐
tionship	between	government	and	 individual	access	to	 the	health	care	system	as	primarily	
either	about	collective	governance	or	about	fostering	individual	self‐governance.		Fundamen‐
tally,	the	legitimacy	of	the	individual	mandate	turns	on	whether	the	Court	will	accept	that	a	
sacrifice	of	individual	economic	liberty	is	justified	by	an	obligation	to	contribute	to	the	com‐
mon	good	that	accompanies	membership	in	the	American	political	community.	
The	 centrality	of	 economic	 liberty	 claims	 to	 the	 individual	mandate	debate	 is	 evident	
from	the	current	litigation,	in	which	individual	plaintiffs	have	described	the	harm	they	suf‐
fer	from	the	allegedly	unconstitutional	exercise	of	power	in	economic	terms.		In	Florida	ex	
rel.	McCollum	v.	United	States	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services,	for	example,	one	
plaintiff	asserted	that	he	had	no	health	insurance	nor	any	intention	of	purchasing	any,	and	
that,	 further,	 “he	 is,	and	expects	 to	remain,	 financially	able	 to	pay	 for	his	own	healthcare	
 
100 See	Mark	A.	Hall,	Commerce	Clause	Challenges	to	Health	Care	Reform,	159	U.	Pa.	L.	Rev.	XX,	XX	(2011)	(arguing	that	
Congress	is	permitted	to	regulate	the	insurance	industry	and	that	the	individual	mandate	is	necessary	and	proper	to	that	permis‐
sion).	
  
services	 if	 and	 as	 needed.”101	 	 In	 Thomas	More	 Law	Center	 v.	 Obama,	 the	District	 Court	
found	that	the	individual	plaintiffs	had	standing	because	of	the	present	injury	of	
being	compelled	 to	 ‘reorganize	 their	 [financial]	affairs’	.	.	.	.	Plaintiffs’	decision	 to	 fo‐
rego	certain	spending	today,	so	that	they	will	have	the	funds	to	pay	for	health	insur‐
ance	when	the	Individual	Mandate	takes	effect	in	2014,	are	injuries	fairly	traceable	to	
the	Act	for	the	purposes	of	conferring	standing.		There	is	nothing	improbable	about	
the	 contention	 that	 the	 Individual	 Mandate	 is	 causing	 plaintiffs	 to	 feel	 economic	
pressure	today.102	
These	assertions	 recall	 two	cases	decided	by	 the	Supreme	Court	 slightly	more	 than	a	
century	ago	which	also	concerned	the	legitimacy	of	a	health‐related	mandate	grounded	in	
social	 welfare	 policy.	 	 In		
Jacobson	 v.	 Massachusetts,	 the	 Court	 upheld	 a	 requirement	 that	 every	 resident	 of	 Cam‐
bridge,	Massachusetts,	be	vaccinated	 for	smallpox,	 rejecting	 the	argument	 that	 it	violated	
bodily	liberty.103		Less	than	two	months	later,	in	Lochner	v.	New	York,	the	Court	upheld	the	
primacy	of	economic	liberty	and	the	right	of	contract	by	invalidating	a	law	that	set	a	maxi‐
mum	daily	 number	 for	 hours	worked,	 a	 law	 that	 looked	 like	 a	 present‐day	 occupational	
health	and	safety	regulation.104	
 
101 716	F.	Supp.	2d	at	1145.	
102 720	F.	Supp.	2d	at	888‐89.		103 See	197	U.S.	11,	12‐13,	26‐27	(1905)	(“[T]he	liberty	secured	by	the	Constitution	.	.	.	does	not	import	an	absolute	right	in	
each	person	to	be,	at	all	times	and	in	all	circumstances,	wholly	freed	from	restraint.”).	
104 See	198	U.S.	45,	61	(1905),	abrogated	by	W.	Coast	Hotel	Co.	v.	Parrish,	300	U.S.	379	(1937)	(“The	Act	is	not,	within	any	
fair	meaning	of	the	term,	a	health	law,	but	is	an	illegal	interference	with	the	rights	of	individuals	.	.	.	.”).		
 The	contemporary	controversy	over	the	legitimacy	of	the	individual	mandate	in	PPACA	
resonates	with	these	two	constitutional	landmarks,	not	at	the	level	of	doctrine	or	precedent	
but	in	the	realm	of	social	meaning.		At	bottom,	both	Jacobson	and	Lochner	concerned	how	
much	sacrifice	of	liberty	could	be	demanded	of	the	individual	by	the	state	in	the	interest	of	
furthering	the	social	compact,	specifically	in	the	context	of	health.	 	In	each	case,	the	Court	
had	to	determine	how	direct	or	necessary	the	sacrifice	of	a	right	was	to	achieving	the	com‐
mon	good.		In	Jacobson,	the	Court	framed	the	justification	for	coerced	vaccination	as	neces‐
sary,	 literally,	 for	community	survival,	a	 linkage	that	made	sense	in	the	context	of	an	epi‐
demic	 of	 infectious	 disease	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 last	 century:105	 	 “Upon	 the	 principle	 of	
self‐defense,	of	paramount	necessity,	a	community	has	the	right	to	protect	itself	against	an	
epidemic	 of	 disease	 which	 threatens	 the	 safety	 of	 its	 members.”106	 	 The	 Court	 also	 de‐
scribed	the	individual’s	duty	as	part	of	a	social	compact	with	the	state:	
There	are	manifold	 restraints	 to	which	every	person	 is	necessarily	 subject	 for	 the	
common	 good	.	.	.	.	 This	 court	 has	more	 than	 once	 recognized	 it	 as	 a	 fundamental	
principle	 that	 “persons	 and	 property	 are	 subjected	 to	 all	 kinds	 of	 restraints	 and	
burdens	in	order	to	secure	the	general	comfort,	health,	and	prosperity	of	the	State;	
of	the	perfect	right	of	the	legislature	to	do	which	no	question	ever	was,	or	upon	ac‐
 
105 See	Ctrs.	for	Disease	Control	&	Prevention,	Impact	of	Vaccines	Universally	Recommended	for	Children—United	States,	
1900–1998,	281	JAMA	1482,	1482	(1999)	(“At	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century,	infectious	diseases	were	widely	prevalent	in	
the	United	States	and	exacted	an	enormous	toll	on	the	population.		For	example,	in	1900,	21,064	smallpox	cases	were	reported,	
and	894	patients	died.”).			
106 Jacobson,	197	U.S.	at	27.	
  
knowledged	general	principles	ever	can	be	made,	so	far	as	natural	persons	are	con‐
cerned.”107	
By	contrast,	the	same	Court	in	Lochner	viewed	the	maximum	hours	law	as	an	illegiti‐
mate	ruse	used	to	curtail	the	dynamics	of	the	labor	market:	
The	act	is	not,	within	any	fair	meaning	of	the	term,	a	health	law,	but	is	an	illegal	in‐
terference	 with	 the	 rights	 of	 individuals,	 both	 employers	 and	 employés	 [sic],	 to	
make	contracts	regarding	 labor	upon	such	terms	as	 they	may	think	best,	or	which	
they	may	agree	upon	with	the	other	parties	to	such	contracts.108	
The	Court’s	reasoning	in	both	cases,	together	with	the	citizenship	cases	and	Helvering,	de‐
monstrates	that	as	context	and	historical	circumstance	shift,	so	do	the	formulations	of	a	cit‐
izen’s	duty.	
There	are,	 of	 course,	many	ways	 to	distinguish	 these	 two	 cases	 from	 the	PPACA	 law‐
suits.		Perhaps	the	most	important	difference	is	that	Jacobson	and	Lochner	involved	the	in‐
vocation	of	a	state’s	police	power,109	rather	than	the	invocation	by	Congress	of	its	powers	
under	Article	I.		And	of	course,	the	Lochner	era	has	long	since	ended;110	unless	plaintiffs	can	
demonstrate	that	a	noneconomic,	fundamental	liberty	interest	is	at	stake,	the	United	States	
 
107 Id.	at	26	(citations	omitted)	(quoting	Thorpe	v.	Rutland	&	Burlington	R.R.,	27	Vt.	140,	150	(1854)).	108 198	U.S.	at	61.	
109 See	Jacobson,	197	U.S.	at	25	(“According	to	settled	principles,	the	police	power	of	a	State	must	be	held	to	embrace,	at	
least,	such	reasonable	regulations	.	.	.	as	will	protect	the	public	health	and	the	public	safety.”);	Lochner,	198	U.S.	at	54	(describing	
the	act	at	issue	as	an	“assumed	exercise	of	[the	state’s]	police	power”).	
110 See,	e.g.,	Whalen	v.	Roe,	429	U.S.	589,	597	(1977)	(“The	holding	in	Lochner	has	been	implicitly	overruled	many	times.”);	
Day‐Brite	Lighting,	Inc.	v.	Missouri,	342	U.S.	421,	423	(1952)	(recognizing	the	implied	overruling	of	Lochner’s	holding).		
 need	only	 show	that	PPACA’s	 individual	mandate	satisfies	 rational	basis	 review.111	 	With	
evidence	that	Congress	went	to	considerable	 lengths	to	clarify	that	the	mandate	 is	neces‐
sary	to	the	entire	statutory	scheme,	the	Michigan	court	had	little	difficulty	dismissing	plain‐
tiffs’	substantive	due	process	claims.112		Thus,	the	doctrinal	resolution	of	the	constitutional‐
ity	of	the	mandate	centers	on	the	Commerce	Clause	and	tax	power,	augmented	by	the	Ne‐
Necessary	and	Proper	Clause,	and	not	on	recognition	of	an	economic	liberty	interest.	
At	the	level	of	social	meaning,	however,	PPACA	challenges	are	not	about	federalism,	the	
Commerce	Clause,	or	taxation.		Just	as	today	I	would	doubt	that	a	person	quarantined	after	
arriving	 on	 a	 flight	 from	New	York	 to	 Los	 Angeles	would	much	 care	whether	 federal	 or	
state	health	authorities	ordered	the	quarantine,113	I	doubt	that	the	final	ruling	on	the	con‐
stitutionality	 of	 the	 individual	 mandate	 will	 be	 understood	 as	 resolving	 the	 question	 of	
which	level	of	government	has	the	power	to	force	an	individual	into	a	community‐rating	in‐
surance	 system.	 	 Rather,	 the	 popular	 understanding	 likely	 will	 center	 on	 the	 issue	 of	
whether	persons	can	be	compelled	by	any	level	of	government	to	participate	in	a	social	in‐
surance	compact	for	the	common	good,	or	whether,	when	the	rational	economic	choice	of	
particular	 individuals	would	 be	 to	 go	 it	 alone,	 a	 requirement	 to	 obtain	 health	 insurance	
would	amount	to	what	the	Lochner	court	called	“meddlesome	interference[]	with	the	rights	
of	the	individual.”114	
 
111 See	Thomas	More	Law	Ctr.	v.	Obama,	720	F.	Supp.	2d	882,	891‐92	(E.D.	Mich.	2010)	(stating	that	the	court	should	deter‐
mine	 only	whether	 there	 is	 a	 rational	 basis	 for	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 regulated	 activities	 substantially	 affect	 interstate	 com‐
merce).	112 Id.	at	893‐95	(explaining	Congress’s	rational	basis	for	passing	PPACA).	
113 Federal	 quarantine	 authority	 is	 limited	 to	 situations	 in	which	 an	 individual	with	 a	 communicable	disease	may	 cross	
state	lines.		See	42	U.S.C.	§	264(d)	(2006).	
114 Lochner	v.	New	York,	198	U.S.	45,	61	(1905),	abrogated	by	W.	Coast	Hotel	Co.	v.	Parrish,	300	U.S.	379	(1937).	
  
In	 the	debates	over	 the	validity	of	PPACA	 that	occur	outside	 the	confines	of	 litigation	
briefs,	 these	broader	 themes	of	 social	meaning	dominate.	 	One	main	 strategy	of	PPACA’s	
opponents	has	been	to	persuade	legislatures	in	six	states	to	adopt	“health	insurance	free‐
dom”	 laws	 that	would	 prohibit	 any	 individual	mandate,	 state	 or	 federal.115	 	 In	 the	 2010	
election,	voters	in	Arizona	and	Oklahoma	amended	their	state	constitutions	to	add	the	lan‐
guage	of	“health	insurance	freedom.”116		The	primary	purpose	of	these	amendments	is	not	
the	 creation	 of	 new	 law.	 	 “Health	 insurance	 freedom”	 language	 adds	nothing	 to	 disputes	
over	whether	the	mandate	exceeds	the	power	of	Congress.		It	is	a	makeweight	for	purposes	
of	Tenth	Amendment	analysis.		If	the	individual	mandate	is	found	to	be	within	the	scope	of	
Article	I	powers,	it	will	trump	any	and	all	conflicting	state	laws	by	virtue	of	the	Supremacy	
Clause.		The	value	of	the	“health	insurance	freedom”	campaign	to	its	proponents	lies	in	the	
very	process	of	enactment—in	the	opportunity	created	by	the	legislative	debates	and	elec‐
 
115 See,	e.g.,	Ga.	Code	Ann.	§	31‐1‐11	(Lexis	through	2010	Reg.	Sess.	2011);	Idaho	Code	Ann.	§	39‐9003	(Supp.	2010);	La.	
Rev.	Stat.	Ann.	§	22:10186	(Supp.	15	2011);	Mo.	Rev.	Stat.	§	1.330	(West,	Westlaw	through	April	13,	2011);	Va.	Code	Ann.	art.	
4.1,	§	38.2‐3430.1:1	(Supp.	6A	2010);	.		The	American	Legislative	Exchange	Council,	an	organization	that	“advocates	limited	gov‐
ernment	and	free	markets,”	provided	instruction	to	several	states	in	developing	these	laws.		Monica	Davey,	Health	Care	Overhaul	
and	Mandatory	Coverage	Stir	States’	Rights	Claims,	N.Y.	Times,	Sept.	29,	2009,	at	A25;	see	also	Press	Release,	Am.	Legislative	
Exch.	 Council,	 Freedom	 of	 Choice	 in	 Health	 Care	 Act,	
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FOCA&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15323	 (last	 visited	Mar.	
15,	2011)	(noting	that	forty‐two	states	have	utilized	this	model	act	in	introducing	or	announcing	health	insurance	freedom	laws).		
The	language	of	the	Virginia	statute	is	typical:	
No	resident	of	this	Commonwealth,	regardless	of	whether	he	has	or	is	eligible	for	health	insurance	coverage	under	any	policy	or	
program	provided	by	or	through	his	employer,	or	a	plan	sponsored	by	the	Commonwealth	or	the	federal	government,	shall	be	
required	to	obtain	or	maintain	a	policy	of	individual	insurance	coverage	except	as	required	by	a	court	or	the	Department	of	So‐
cial	Services	where	an	individual	is	named	a	party	in	a	judicial	or	administrative	proceeding.	
Va	Code	Ann.	§	38.2‐3430.1:1.		116 See	Ariz.	Const.	art.	XXVII,	§	2	(stating	that	no	Arizonan	shall	be	forced	“to	participate	in	any	health	care	system”	or	be	
required	to	pay	a	fine	for	paying	directly	for	health	care);	Okla.	Const.	art.	II,	§	37	(providing	essentially	the	same	guarantee).	
 toral	campaigns	to	build	public	participation	in	the	discourse	of	individual	liberty	as	supe‐
rior	to	collective	obligation.117	
III.		Citizenship	Practices	and	the	Patient	Protection	
Affordable	Care	Act	
In	 this	Part,	 I	 argue	 for	using	a	 concept	of	 citizenship	practices	 to	understand	 the	so‐
cio‐legal	relationship	between	individuals	and	social	 insurance	programs.	 	As	I	use	 it,	 the	
term	“citizenship	practices”	 incorporates	 the	 functional	components	of	 citizen‐like	activi‐
ties,	such	as	participation	in	governance,	and	also	captures	the	ways	in	which	the	design	of	
social	welfare	laws	shapes	individual	and	social	understandings	of	identity	and	belonging.		I	
describe	some	of	the	most	important	structural	design	questions	that	remain	open	for	deci‐
sion	during	the	implementation	phase	of	PPACA,	with	a	focus	on	points	that	will	enhance	or	
curb	the	potential	for	citizen	engagement	in	governance.		I	close	this	Part	with	commentary	
on	possible	future	social	meanings	of	PPACA.	
A.		The	Concept	of	“Citizenship	Practices”	
Throughout	this	Article,	I	have	sought	to	build	on	the	usefulness	of	citizenship	as	a	me‐
taphor	without	becoming	ensnared	 in	 its	 formal	definition.	 	The	difficulties	of	navigating	
that	tension	lead	me	to	propose	the	term	“citizenship	practices”	as	a	better	tool	for	signify‐
 
117 See,	e.g.,	Laura	Ingraham,	The	Obama	Diaries	119	(2010)	(expressing	the	point	of	view	that	PPACA	infringes	on	con‐
stitutional	 rights);	Bill	O’Reilly,	Pinheads	and	Patriots:	 	Where	You	Stand	 in	 the	Age	of	Obama	 57‐60	 (2010)	 (describing	
PPACA	and	arguing	that	it	passed	only	because	of	political	maneuvering);	Michael	Savage,	Trickle	Up	Poverty	115‐53	(2010)	(dis‐
cussing	PPACA’s	shortcomings	 in	 language	aimed	at	a	 lay	audience);	Sally	C.	Pipes,	Repeal	 the	Individual	Mandate	of	Obamacare,	
HumanEvents.com	(Aug.	12,	2010),	http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38517	(describing	the	 individual	mandate	as	
“an	egregious	assualt	on	our	economic	liberty”);	The	Rush	Limbaugh	Show:		Battle	over	Obamacare	Repeal	Is	Essentially	a	De‐
bate	 About	 Liberty	 (Premier	 Radio	 Networks	 Dec.	 14,	 2010),	 available	 at	 http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/	
home/daily/site_121410/content/01125113.guest.html	(arguing	that	PPACA	infringes	on	the	American	people’s	liberty	by	forc‐
ing	them	to	buy	health	care).	
  
ing	 a	multi‐dimensional,	 nontechnical,	 and	 normative	 concept	 of	 citizenship,	 rather	 than	
stretching	citizenship	as	a	metaphor	so	far	that	the	word	becomes	almost	meaningless.	
I	 intend	“citizenship	practices”	to	denote	both	concrete	activities	and	the	social	mean‐
ings	 associated	with	 citizenship.	 	 Specifically,	 I	mean	 it	 to	 denote	 the	 discourses,	 institu‐
tions,	and	statutory	programs	that	comprise	a	network	of	social	structures.	 	This	network	
in	 turn	gives	birth	 to	 the	constellation	of	 rights,	obligations,	 and	belonging	 that	we	asso‐
ciate	with	citizenship.	 	These	structures	exist	within	the	state,	the	market,	and	contempo‐
rary	civil	society.		“Citizenship	practices”	manifest	in	narrative,	identities,	and	institutions,	
as	well	as	laws.	
I	 specifically	 intend	 the	 term	 to	 build	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 “policy	 feedback”—the	ways	
that	“policies,	once	enacted,	restructure	subsequent	political	processes”118—as	well	as	on	
the	idea	of	citizenship	as	metaphor.		Theda	Skocpol,	a	leading	developer	of	the	idea	of	poli‐
cy	feedback,	has	described	such	effects	as	not	only	those	that	could	transform	state	admin‐
istrative	capacity	but	also	those	that	can	affect	the	identities,	political	goals,	and	capabilities	
of	social	groups.119		PPACA	will	surely	fulfill	both	possibilities,	but	it	is	the	latter	set	of	ef‐
fects	that	overlaps	with	citizenship	practices,	insofar	as	they	help	to	frame	narratives	about	
who	is	responsible	for	what	and	why,	and	who	has	a	legitimate	expectation	of	participatory	
engagement	in	policymaking.	
 
118 Theda	Skocpol,	Protecting	Soldiers	and	Mothers:	 	The	Political	Origins	of	Social	Policy	in	the	United	States	58	
(1992).	
119 Id.	
 Policy	and	program	design	are	key	forces	in	structuring	the	ways	in	which	individuals	
and	social	welfare	systems	interact.		The	particulars	of	such	design	will	shape	whether	me‐
chanisms	exist	that	can	force,	enhance,	or	limit	public	participation	in	deliberation,	as	well	as	
how	successful	such	mechanisms	will	be.		In	turn,	answers	to	those	questions	will	foretell	the	
extent	to	which	interest	groups	will	form	and	flourish	around	the	needs	of	program	constitu‐
ents.		From	these	roots,	perceptions	will	arise	about	how,	why,	and	for	whom	the	programs	
operate.	
B.		The	Design	of	Exchanges	Under	PPACA	
In	the	health	care	arena,	alternative	modes	of	citizenship	practices	could	be	especially	
important.		Voters	elect	officials	who	determine	health	policies,	but	it	is	usually	not	possi‐
ble	 to	unbundle	health	 from	other	 issues.	 	Moreover,	 citizen	engagement	with	 respect	 to	
elections	is	low,	as	captured	by	Michael	Walzer’s	description	of	citizens	as	“spectators	who	
vote.”120	Exchange‐level	 entities,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 could	provide	more	 localized	oppor‐
tunities	for	developing	citizenship	skills	such	as	self‐governance	and	leadership,	as	well	as	
a	venue	 in	which	smaller	decisions	may	ultimately	shape	 larger	and	more	distant	policy‐
making.	 	Two	critically	 important	 issues	 for	 the	development	of	citizenship	practices	and	
policy	feedback	dynamics	under	PPACA	will	be	whether	the	new	institutions	created	pur‐
suant	to	PPACA	could	also	create	potential	sites	for	policy	entrepreneurs	seeking	to	maxim‐
ize	democratic	input	into	health	policy	to	intervene,	and	whether	these	institutions	will	fa‐
 
120 Michael	Walzer,	The	Civil	Society	Argument,	in	The	Citizenship	Debates	291,	300	(Gershon	Shafir	ed.,	1998).		
  
cilitate	an	allegiance	 to	norms	of	social	 insurance	on	the	part	of	 those	who	participate	 in	
them.	
Section	 1311	 of	 PPACA	 requires	 states	 to	 establish	 “American	 Health	 Benefit	 Ex‐
changes”	 by	 January	 1,	 2014.121	 	 PPACA	 distinguishes	 between	 exchanges	 for	 individual	
purchasers	of	health	insurance	and	exchanges	for	small	businesses	seeking	to	find	coverage	
for	 their	 employees	 (the	 “Small	Business	Health	Options	Program”),	 and	 allows	 states	 to	
choose	between	creating	 two	exchanges	or	one	 that	will	 serve	both	markets.122	 	Alterna‐
tively,	states	may	join	with	one	another	to	create	regional	insurance	exchanges,123	offering	
consumers	increased	economies	of	scale	and	portability,	or	may	opt	into	a	federally	run	ex‐
change.124		In	addition	to	creating	a	competitive	marketplace	for	insurance	and	pooling	risk	
for	groups	that	traditionally	have	been	hard	to	cover,	the	exchanges	will	also	channel	eligi‐
ble	individuals	into	Medicaid,	CHIP,	and	other	public	programs.125	
PPACA	provides	initial	funding	for	the	exchanges,126	but	leaves	states	considerable	dis‐
cretion	in	structuring	the	design	and	implementation	thereof,	creating	a	fundamentally	fe‐
 
121 PPACA	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(b)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010).		If	by	January	1,	2013,	the	Secretary	of	Health	and	Human	
Services	determines	that	a	state	has	not	taken	the	necessary	steps	toward	establishing	an	exchange	and	will	not	have	a	functional	
exchange	 in	 place	 by	 2014,	 the	 Secretary	 will	 establish	 and	 operate	 an	 exchange	 in	 that	 state.	 	 Id.	 §	 1321(c),	 42	 U.S.C.A.	 §	
18041(c).							122 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(b)(1)–(2).	
123 Id.,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(f)(1).	 	New	Mexico,	 for	example,	 interprets	 the	benefits	of	a	 regional	exchange	 to	 include	 in‐
creased	long‐run	efficiencies	and	expanded	portability	for	residents.		New	Mexico	Human	Servs.	Dep’t,	Implementing	Federal	
Health	Care	Reform—A	Roadmap	for	New	Mexico	26	(2010).	124 See	PPACA	§	1321(c)	(authorizing	 the	U.S.	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	 to	establish	exchanges	 in	non‐
compliant	states	after	January	1,	2013).		125 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(d)(4).	
126 Id.,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(a).	 	The	Health	 Insurance	Exchange	Planning	grant	provides	states	with	funding	for	economic	
modeling,	actuarial	analyses,	data	collection,	and	identification	of	necessary	resources	such	as	information	technology	to	create	an	
exchange.		Id.,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(a)(1)–(3).		Forty‐eight	states	and	the	District	of	Columbia	received	the	first	round	of	grants	in	Sep‐
tember	2010.		Office	of	Consumer	Info.	&	Ins.	Oversight,	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Health	&	Human	Servs.,	Initial	Guidance	to	States	on	Ex‐
 deralist	 system	 for	procuring	health	 insurance	 for	 individuals	 and	 small	 businesses.	 	 It	 is	
likely	that	most	states	will	exercise	the	opportunity	to	create	their	own	exchanges	in	order	
to	streamline	coordination	with	related	state	programs	such	as	Medicaid	and	to	tailor	 the	
exchange	to	their	population’s	needs.127	
With	little	statutory	guidance	on	exchange	functions,	structure,	and	governance,	states	
have	a	great	deal	of	discretion	 to	exercise	 in	a	 short	window	of	 time.128	 	The	most	 likely	
models	exist	in	Massachusetts,	Utah,	and	states	that,	like	California,	were	among	the	earli‐
est	to	create	exchanges.129		In	2006,	when	Massachusetts	imposed	its	own	mandate	on	state	
residents,	 it	 created	 the	 Commonwealth	 Health	 Insurance	 Connector	 to	 help	 individuals	
purchase	affordable	coverage.130		The	Massachusetts	Connector	provided	a	template	for	the	
exchange	system	established	in	PPACA.131		Utah	created	a	similar	exchange	in	2009,132	and	
California	 enacted	 legislation	 in	 2010	 creating	 the	 California	Health	 Benefit	 Exchange.133		
These	three	models	are	 likely	 to	guide	other	states	as	 they	make	decisions	regarding	 im‐
portant	 governance	 issues	 in	 the	 process	 of	 creating	 PPACA	 compliant	 exchanges.	 	 Two	
 
changes	 (2010),	 available	 at	 http://www.healthcare.gov/center/regulations/	
guidance_to_states_on_exchanges.html.			
127 For	example,	New	Mexico’s	strategic	plan	for	health	care	reform	has	identified	these	reasons	as	sufficient	to	justify	the	
expense	of	establishing	its	own	exchange.		New	Mexico	Human	Servs.	Dep’t,	supra	note	123,	at	25‐26;	see	also	Robert	Carey,	
State	Coverage	 Initiatives,	Health	 Insurance	Exchanges:	 	Key	 Issues	 for	 State	 Implementation	 2‐3	 (2010),	 available	 at	
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/70388.pdf	 (describing	why	 states	will	 likely	prefer	 to	 create	 their	own	exchanges,	 rather	
than	be	subject	to	a	federally	run	exchange).		In	addition,	the	New	Mexico	Human	Services	Department	has	noted	that	“ambitious	
federal	 timelines”	may	 prohibit	 development	 of	 a	 regional	 exchange.	 	New	Mexico	Human	Servs.	Dep’t,	 supra	 note	 123,	 at	
26‐27.			128 See	Jost,	supra	note	97,	at	5	(noting	that	states	face	a	“daunting	list	of	tasks”).	
129 See	Rachel	Brand,	Facing	the	Future:		Setting	up	Health	Insurance	Exchanges	is	One	of	the	Big,	Early	Tasks	for	Lawmak‐
ers,	State	Legislatures,	at	22,	24‐26,	Oct.–Nov.	2010	(discussing	early	state	efforts	at	exchange	creation).	
130 	Mass.	Ann.	Laws	ch.	176Q,	§	3	(LexisNexis	Supp.	2009).			131 See	Staff	of	Senate	Fin.	Comm.,	111th	Cong.,	Description	of	Policy	Options:		Expanding	Health	Care	Coverage:		Pro‐
posals	to	Provide	Affordable	Coverage	to	All	Americans	4	(2009)	(“[T]he	Health	Insurance	Exchange	concept	is	similar	in	some	
ways	to	the	Massachusetts	Connector	.	.	.	.”).	
132 Utah	Code	Ann.	§	31A‐2‐218(3)	(LexisNexis	Supp.	2010).	133 California	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act,	ch.	655,	sec.	3,	§	15438(s)(1),	2010	Cal.	Stat.	3553,	3556	(to	be	
codified	at	Cal.	Gov’t	Code	§	15438).	
  
such	issues	are	whether	an	exchange	will	act	as	a	clearinghouse	or	as	an	active	purchaser	
of	plans,	and	whether	the	exchange	will	be	housed	in	a	government	agency	or	a	nonprofit	
entity.	
1.		Regulation	
States	must	 determine	 how	much	 oversight	 they	will	 exercise	 over	 health	 insurance	
plans	 offered	 through	 their	 exchanges.	 	 PPACA	 restricts	 entry	 to	 the	 exchange	 to	 those	
plans	whose	availability	 in	an	exchange	 serves	 the	 “interests	of	qualified	 individuals	and	
qualified	employers,”134	those	that	offer	at	least	silver	and	gold	benefit	tiers,	and	those	that	
meet	additional	criteria	to	be	established	by	the	Secretary.135		States	may	opt	to	impose	ad‐
ditional	participation	requirements	on	plans,	allowing	the	exchange	to	serve	as	a	gatekee‐
per	to	maximize	quality	and	minimize	cost.136	
Some	 states	 may	 follow	 the	 Utah	 Health	 Exchange	 model,	 and	 provide	 a	 “clearing‐
house”	of	health	insurance	plans	that	meet	the	federal	minimum	standards.137		This	mod‐
el,	which	 could	be	 analogized	 to	 various	online	 commercial	websites,	would	 allow	 con‐
sumers	the	greatest	number	of	options,	but	may	fall	short	of	providing	them	with	the	best	
 
134 PPACA	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(e)(1)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010).	
135 Id.	§	1301,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18021(a)(1)(c)(ii).	136 Initial	guidance	from	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	endorses	the	variety	of	models,	leaving	the	choice	
up	to	states.	 	See	Office	of	Consumer	Info.	&	Ins.	Oversight,	supra	note	126	(“States	have	a	range	of	options	for	how	the	Ex‐
change	operates	from	an	‘active	purchaser’	model	.	.	.	to	an	‘open	marketplace’	model	.	.	.	.”).	
137 Utah’s	exchange	model	has	been	described	as	functioning	as	a	“market	organizer.”		See	Robert	Carey,	State	Coverage	
Initiatives,	 Preparing	 for	 Health	 Reform:	 	 The	 Role	 of	 the	 Health	 Insurance	 Exchange	 4‐5	 (2010),	 available	 at	
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/57093.pdf	 (describing	 how	 the	 exchange	 acts	 as	 a	 source	 of	 information	 about	 available	
plans,	provides	structure	to	the	market,	and	serves	as	a	broker	by	handling	billing	and	collection).	
 value	 for	 their	 health	 care	 dollars	 by	 not	 imposing		
further	requirements.	
States	 that	 choose	 to	 impose	 greater	 regulation	 on	 the	 plans	 offered	 through	 the	 ex‐
change	could	adopt	what	has	been	termed	a	“selective	contracting	agent”	model.138		Under	
such	a	model,	the	exchange	would	evaluate	insurance	plans	from	different	corners	and	of‐
fer	only	selected	plans.139		The	Massachusetts	Connector	operates	this	way,140	and	has	thus	
far	granted	entry	to	nine	health	plans.	 	California’s	exchange	will	also	selectively	contract	
with	 plans	 to	 create	 a	market	 of	 “optimal	 combination	 of	 choice,	 value,	 quality,	 and	 ser‐
vice,”141	 limiting	participation	to	 those	plans	offering	 five	tiers	of	coverage	(ranging	 from	
catastrophic‐only	 to	platinum	coverage)	both	on	and	off	of	 the	exchange.142	 	Other	states	
struggling	with	rising	health	care	costs	may	find	this	selective	contracting	option	attractive,	
as	it	will	allow	regulators	to	best	control	premium	growth.143	
Finally,	 states	 could	 take	 more	 initiative	 in	 governing	 which	 plans	 will	 be	 offered	
through	their	exchanges	by	acting	as	“active	purchasers”	of	the	health	insurance	plans	of‐
fered.144		Under	such	a	structure,	the	state	exchanges	would	be	able	to	operate	as	large	em‐
ployers	already	do,	negotiating	prices	for	a	 large	risk	pool	and	offering	access	only	to	the	
plans	with	the	best	bids.	
 
138 Carey,	supra	note	127,	at	12.		
139 Id.	
140 See	Mass.	Ann.	Laws	ch.	176Q,	§	3(a)(3)	(LexisNexis	Supp.	2009)	(noting	that	the	Connector’s	purpose	is	to	establish	
procedures	for	selecting	and	certifying	plans	to	be	offered).		
141 Cal.	Health	Care	Found.,	California’s	Insurance	Exchange:		Experts	Tackle	the	Big	Questions	6‐7	(2010)	(quoting	
Sumi	Sousa,	Special	Assistant	to	Assembly	Speaker	John	A.	Perez).	
142 See	id.	at	11	(noting	that	the	California	exchange	requirements	will	exceed	federal	requirements).		
143 New	Mexico	has	 identified	cost	control	as	a	reason	to	consider	 limiting	exchange	participation	to	plans	restricting	
premium	growth	or	offering	other	cost	containing	measures	to	keep	premiums	low.		New	Mexico	Human	Servs.	Dep’t,	supra	
note	127,	at	25‐26.	
144 See	Carey,	supra	note	137,	at	5	(listing	California’s	PacAdvantage	and	the	Texas	Insurance	Purchasing	Alliance	as	ex‐
amples	of	the	active	purchaser	models).	
  
One	policy	analyst	has	noted	that	these	latter	two	models	allow	the	exchanges	to	fulfill	
their	full	potential	as	“critical	forces	in	the	market	to	keep	prices	down	and	generate	better	
quality	care	for	consumers,	employers	and	taxpayers.”145		Though	these	models	envision	a	
greater	role,	and	thus	greater	effort,	by	the	states,	the	models	likely	will	provide	consumers	
with	a	more	streamlined	way	 to	purchase	health	 insurance	 that	will	be	valuable	 to	 them	
and	responsive	to	their	needs.		Regardless	of	the	model	chosen,	after	allowing	a	plan	to	en‐
ter	the	exchange,	a	state	must	regularly	account	for	premium	increases	in	determining	its	
continued	viability	for	the	exchange,	thereby	helping	to	control	price.146	
2.		Public	or	Private	Forms	
Second,	 the	 law	requires	each	state	 to	create	an	exchange	as	either	a	 “governmental	
agency	or	nonprofit	entity	.	.	.	established	by	a	State,”147	meaning	that	a	state	that	does	not	
utilize	 the	 federally	 run	 exchange	 must	 house	 an	 exchange	 within	 the	 government	 or	
create	 a	 new	 nonprofit.148	 	 Indeed	 some	 states	 have	 utilized	 one	 or	 the	 other	 of	 these	
forms	in	order	to	reach	a	decision	as	to	the	form	of	the	permanent	structure.149	
 
145 NAIC	Exchange	Subgroup	Public	Hearing	( July	22,	2010)	(statement	of	Sabrina	Corlette,	Georgetown	University	Health	
Policy	Institute)	(on	file	with	author).	
146 See	PPACA	§§	1311,	10104(f)(1),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(e)(2)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010)	(“The	Exchange	shall	require	health	
plans	seeking	certification	.	.	.	to	submit	a	justification	for	any	premium	increase	prior	to	implementation	of	the	increase	.	.	.	.	The	
Exchange	 shall	 take	 this	 information	.	.	.	 into	 consideration	 when	 determining	 whether	 to	 make	 such	 health	 plan	 available	
through	the	Exchange.”).	147 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(d)(1).	
148 Because	state	exchanges	are	required	to	be	self‐sustaining	by	2015,	states	are	expected	to	prioritize	issues	of	efficiency.		
Id.,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(d)(5).	
149 For	example,	Iowa	created	the	Iowa	Legislative	Health	Care	Coverage	Commission	in	2009	to	determine,	among	other	
things,	where	to	house	an	exchange	that	shall	be	operational	by	July	1,	2011.		Act	of	May	19,	2009,	ch.	118,	§	1.1.a(f),	2009	Iowa	
Acts	391,	392.	 	Colorado	has	 instead	charged	its	Division	of	 Insurance	with	 identifying	the	necessary	changes	to	Colorado	law	
that	PPACA	will	require.		See	Lorez	Meinhold,	Office	of	the	Governor,	Implementing	Health	Care	Reform:		A	Roadmap	for	
 Efficiency	considerations150	may	be	in	tension	with	other	concerns.	 	A	publicly	run	ex‐
change	would	be	directly	linked	with	the	state’s	administration,	facilitating	communication	
with	related	government	bodies	(including	the	state	Medicaid	office,	insurance	department,	
and	consumer	protection	agency).151		State‐operated	exchanges	will	also	likely	offer	greater	
transparency,	a	factor	that	California	considered	in	deciding	to	create	an	independent	gov‐
ernment	 entity.152	 	 However,	 despite	 ease	 of	 communications	with	 related	 entities,	 state	
bureaucracy	 and	political	 considerations	may	 slow	or	 complicate	decisionmaking,	 hiring,	
and	 contracting.153	 	 Creating	 an	 independent	 or	 quasigovernmental	 public	 agency—or	 a	
nonprofit	organization—could	alleviate	some	of	these	concerns	by	uncoupling	these	func‐
tions	 from	 politicians	 but	 would	 reduce	 the	 efficiencies	 gained	 by	 having	 direct	 contact	
with	state	agencies.154	
Additionally,	state‐run	exchanges	may	pose	bigger	conflict‐ofinterest	problems.155		For	
example,	Connecticut	recently	created	SustiNet,	a	state‐run	health	plan	that	will	be	offered	
on	Connecticut’s	exchange	if	it	is	certified	as	a	qualified	plan.156		SustiNet’s	Board	of	Direc‐
tors	has	noted	that	governance	of	the	state‐run	plan	and	the	exchange	must	be	entirely	dis‐
 
Colorado	13	(2010)	(noting	that	the	Colorado	Division	of	Finance	is	inventorying	PPACA	and	state	insurance	law).		
150 See	PPACA	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.	§	18031(d)(5)	(imposing	limitations	on	allocation	of	funds,	including	restrictions	on	waste‐
ful	expenditures).	
151 See,	e.g.,	American	Health	Benefit	Exchange	Model	Act,	§	4(A)	drafting	note	(Nat’l	Ass’n	of	Ins.	Comm’rs,	Draft	2010)	
(addressing	benefits	of	locating	insurance	exchanges	in	a	state	agency	as	opposed	to	other	models).			
152 See	Cal.	Health	Care	Found.,	supra	note	141,	at	9	(“[California]	decided	on	a	government	option	principally	because	gov‐
ernment	‘has	to	conduct	its	business	in	the	public.’”	(quoting	Jennifer	Kent,	Deputy	Sec’y	for	Legislation,	Office	of	the	Governor)).			
153 Cf.	id.	(discussing	the	need	to	make	the	exchange’s	structure	“nimble”).	154 See	Families	USA,	Implementing	Health	Insurance	Exchanges:	 	Options	for	Governance	and	Oversight	5‐6	(2011),	
available	 at	 http://familiesusa2.org/assets/	
pdfs/health‐reform/Exchanges‐Governance‐and‐Oversight.pdf	 (discussing	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 state	 “qua‐
si‐governmental”	agencies	to	hosting	the	exchanges).	
155 See	Jon	Kingsdale	&	John	Bertko,	Insurance	Exchanges	Under	Health	Reform:		Six	Design	Issues	for	the	States,	29	Health	
Aff.	1158,	1159	(2010)	(raising	concerns	about	unfair	discrimination	among	carriers).			
156 SustiNet	coverage	is	available	immediately	to	Medicaid	and	HUSKY	beneficiaries	and	state	employees	or	retirees,	and	to	
small	or	not‐for‐profit	businesses	and	municipalities	as	of	July	1,	2012.		Nancy	Wyman	&	Kevin	Lembo,	SustiNet	Health	P’ship	
Bd.	of	Dirs.,	Implementing	SustiNet	Following	Federal	Enactment	of	 the	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act	of	
2010:		A	Preliminary	Report	to	the	Connecticut	General	Assembly	1	(2010).			
  
tinct	to	avoid	a	conflict	of	interest	and	has	recommended	that	Connecticut	either	opt	into	
the	federal	exchange	or	place	SustiNet	in	the	hands	of	a	quasi‐governmental	agency	that	is	
removed	from	the	state	government.157	
Finally,	choosing	between	state	and	privately	run	exchanges	will	implicate	basic	capaci‐
ty	 concerns.	 	 The	 selected	body	must	 have	 the	 facility	 to	 govern	 the	 exchange,	 including	
performing	the	minimum	set	of	regulatory	functions	PPACA	sets	forth	(e.g.,	certifying	plans	
to	participate,	making	limited‐eligibility	determinations,	and	monitoring	benefits	and	plan	
offerings)	along	with	any	additional	requirements	state	law	imposes.		States	opting	to	place	
the	exchange	within	the	state	government	will	 likely	create	new	entities,	as	extant	bodies	
are	ill‐suited	to	perform	governance	functions,158	although	some	states	may	opt	to	place	an	
exchange	within	the	state	governor’s	office,	as	Utah	did.159		Other	states—such	as	Massachu‐
setts,	 California,	 and	Connecticut—have	or	 are	planning	 to	 create	 a	new	state	 agency,	 and	
will	 appoint	 a	 small	 governing	 board	 (e.g.,	 five	 to	 ten	 people)	 that	 includes	 individuals	
representing	 the	expertise	 the	exchanges	will	demand	(such	as	economists,	actuaries,	plan	
benefit	specialists,	and	health	policy	experts)	along	with	representatives	from	interested	par‐
ties	 (such	 as	 businesses,	 insurers,	 health	 care	 providers,	 and	 consumers).160	 	 In	 addition,	
 
157 Id.			
158 See	Jost,	supra	note	97,	at	2‐6	(noting	that	Medicaid	agencies	may	be	incompetent	to	perform	exchange	regulatory	func‐
tions,	but	that	consumer	protection	agencies	in	some	states	may	be	appropriate	bodies	for	the	exchanges);	see	also	Carey,	supra	
note	127,	at	6	(noting	that	“natural	homes”	for	an	exchange	may	be	found	in	state	insurance	departments,	Medicaid	agencies,	and	
administrators	of	state	employee	health	benefits,	but	that	all	three	lack	specialized	expertise	in	administering	an	exchange).	
159 Utah	housed	its	exchange	within	the	Governor’s	Office	of	Economic	Development,	under	a	new	branch	entitled	the	Of‐
fice	of	Consumer	Health	Services.		Utah	Code	Ann.	63M‐1‐2504	(LexisNexis	Supp.	2010).	
160 For	example,	Connecticut’s	Health	Care	Reform	Advisory	Board	has	recommended	that	the	state	create	a	board	chaired	
by	the	Secretary	of	the	Office	of	Policy	and	Management.		The	board’s	composition	should	include	an	actuary,	a	plan	benefit	spe‐
 states	must	exercise	caution	to	avoid	creating	conflicts	of	interest.161		Even	if	a	new	entity	is	
created	to	govern	an	exchange,	close	interaction	with	related	state	agencies	will	be	critical.		
For	example,	a	governor’s	office	will	likely	play	a	central	role	in	appointing	some	or	all	of	the	
board	members.162		Although	exchanges	will	not	be	required	to	conduct	eligibility	determina‐
tions	with	respect	to	tax	subsidies	or	exemptions,163	they	will	need	close	contact	with	state	
Medicaid	and	insurance	agencies	to	facilitate	proper	referrals	of	those	eligible	for	public	cov‐
erage.	
3.		Information	Requirements	and	Consumer	Participation	
Two	key	goals	of	PPACA’s	exchanges	are	to	create	greater	information	disclosure	and	to	
foster	public	participation	in	the	health	insurance	sector.		The	exchanges	expand	consumer	
access	to	plan	information	and	create	avenues	for	public	involvement	in	the	decisionmak‐
ing	process.		The	specific	aims	are	to	facilitate	easy	plan	comparison,	to	maximize	transpa‐
rency,	and	to	boost	competition.	 	Moreover,	this	“two‐way	street”	will	cultivate	consumer	
 
cialist,	a	health	care	economist,	the	Commissioners	of	Social	Services,	Public	Health,	and	Insurance,	and	the	State	Comptroller,	as	
well	as	representatives	from	small	and	large	businesses,	insurers,	providers,	and	consumers.		Conn.	Health	Care	Reform	Advi‐
sory	Bd.,	Final	Report	to	Governor	Rell	and	the	General	Assembly	10	(2010).	 	Massachusetts’s	Connector	is	governed	by	a	
board	composed	of	four	public	officers	as	well	as	six	appointed	members	(three	appointed	by	the	office	of	the	attorney	general	
and	three	by	the	governor’s	office).		Mass.	Ann.	Laws	ch.	176Q,	§	2	(LexisNexis	Supp.	2010).		The	board	governing	California’s	
exchange	will	include	two	members	appointed	by	the	governor,	one	each	appointed	by	the	state	senate	and	house,	and	one	ap‐
pointed	by	the	Secretary	of	Health	and	Human	Services.	 	Act	of	Sept.	30,	2010,	ch.	659,	sec.	2,	§	10500(a)	2010	Cal.	Stat.	3598,	
3599	(to	be	codified	at	Cal.	Gov’t	Code	§	10500).	 	For	a	discussion	of	the	structure	of	governing	boards	of	exchanges,	see	Jost,	
supra	note	97,	at	6‐7.		161 States	will	likely	have	to	prohibit	representatives	from	the	health	care	and	insurance	industries	from	board	participa‐
tion.		For	example,	California’s	law	prohibits	a	board	member	from	seeking	employment	with	an	insurer,	agent,	broker,	or	health	
care	provider	within	one	year	of	 service,	 and	bars	 any	 compensation	during	 service.	 	 Sec.	 2,	 §	10500(f)(2),	2010	 Cal.	 Stat.	 at	
3599.		For	a	more	in‐depth	discussion,	see	Jost,	supra	note	97,	at	6‐7	(discussing	how	to	structure	agency	boards	in	order	to	pre‐
vent	conflicts	of	interest).	162 See	Jost,	supra	note	97,	at	7	(noting	that	the	most	common	state	board	structure	will	require	the	governor’s	office	to	
appoint	board	members	subject	to	approval	by	the	legislature).	163 PPACA	requires	the	Treasury	to	make	subsidy	payments	directly	to	plans,	meaning	that	a	state	exchange	may	decline	
any	involvement	in	the	eligibility	process.		Cf.	Cal.	Health	Care	Found.,	supra	note	141,	at	5	(noting	that	this	provision	is	differ‐
ent	from	the	payment	structure	in	Massachusetts).			
  
participation	 in	 the	 structuring	of	 exchanges	and	 regulations,	 thereby	augmenting	public	
acceptance	of	a	changing	health	care	market.	
a.		Providing	Consumer	Information	
PPACA	 requires	 exchanges	 to	 facilitate	 easy	 comparisons	 of	 plan	 benefits,	 costs,	 and	
policies,	seeking	to	maximize	competition	among	participating	plans.		More	specifically,	the	
law	 requires	 states	 to	 provide,	 at	 a	minimum,	 plain	 language	 summary	 information	 and	
quality	ratings.164		PPACA	also	requires	states	to	engage	hard‐to‐reach	populations.165		For	
assistance	in	providing	this	information,	states	may	apply	for	grants	to	expand	or	create	of‐
fices	of	health	insurance	consumer	assistance	or	ombudsman	programs.166	
The	plain	language	summaries	of	plan	benefits,167	as	well	as	quality	ratings,168	will	sup‐
plement	information	already	available	on	a	federally	created	website	providing	plan	infor‐
mation.169		This	information	must	incorporate	data	on	provider	accessibility,	cost	sharing,	
health	outcomes,	readmission	rates,	safety	and	error	reduction	programs,	medical‐loss	ra‐
 
164 PPACA	§	10104(f)(2),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(e)(3)(B)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010).	
165 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(d)(6)(e).	
166 Id.	sec.	1002,	§	2793,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	300gg‐93	(West	Supp.	1A	2010).		In	2011,	twenty‐nine	million	dollars	of	grant	money	
is	available	for	the	development	or	expansion	of	consumer	assistance	programs.		Grants	will	be	awarded	by	the	Department	of	
Health	and	Human	Services’s	Office	of	Consumer	Information	and	Insurance	Oversight	(OCIIO).		Office	of	Consumer	Info.	&	Ins.	
Oversight,	Dep’t	of	Health	&	Human	Servs.,	CFDA	No.	93,519,	Affordable	Care	Act—Consumer	Assistance	Program	Grants	
Initial	Announcement:		Invitation	to	Apply	for	FY	2010,	at	4	(2010).		
167 PPACA	§	10104(f)(2)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010).		The	format	for	plan	summaries	will	be	designed	by	the	Secretary	based	on	
input	from	the	National	Association	of	Insurance	Commissioners.		Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(c)(1)(F).	
168 Ratings	must	be	available	for	each	tier	of	coverage,	based	on	the	relative	quality	and	price	of	each	participating	plan,	as	
well	as	beneficiary	satisfaction	scores	for	plans	serving	over	500	individuals.		Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(c)(3)–(4).	
169 PPACA	requires	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	to	create	a	website	helping	consumers	to	identify	cover‐
age	options	by	July	1,	2010.		Id.	§	1103,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18003.	
 tios,	claims	payment	and	denial	policies,	enrollment	patterns,	and	wellness	plans,170	and	be	
available	via	website	as	well	as	through	a	toll‐free	hotline.171		States	will	have	to	determine	
whether	to	make	summary	information	binding	on	insurers,	which	may	prevent	plans	from	
attracting	 consumers	 based	 on	misrepresentations.172	 	 Although	 not	 required,	 additional	
user‐friendly	features	will	likely	further	stimulate	increased	competition.		For	example,	the	
Massachusetts	Connector	provides	consumers	with	a	side‐by‐side	comparison	of	plans	at	a	
given	coverage	level	based	on	the	user’s	age,	household	size,	and	zip	code.173	 	California’s	
law	authorizes	the	exchange	board	to	require	each	participating	plan	to	make	an	electronic	
directory	of	network	providers	available	to	users.174	
In	 addition	 to	 providing	 easily	 accessible	 information,	 PPACA	 requires	 states	 to	 take	
steps	to	reach	out	to	those	least	likely	to	use	the	exchange.		While	employed	individuals	will	
receive	 notice	 of	 an	 available	 exchange	 from	 an	 employer,175	 the	 state	 must	 target	
hard‐to‐reach	 individuals	 in	 need	 of	 coverage,	 thereby	 increasing	 the	 efficacy	 of	 the	
 
170 See,	e.g.,	id.	§	1001,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	300gg‐17	(West	Supp.	1A	2010)	(requiring	health	insurance	providers	to	cover	well‐
ness	programs).		Additionally,	plans	participating	on	the	exchanges	must	report	data	on	in‐	and	out‐of‐network	provider	availa‐
bility	and	cost	sharing	to	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services.		See	id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18003(c)(1)(B)	(West	Supp.	
1B	2010)	(detailing	requirements	for	plan	certification);	id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18003(e)(2)–(3)	(explaining	that	an	exchange	
may	certify	a	health	plan	if	it	meets	certification	guidelines).		For	a	discussion	of	reporting	requirements,	see	Jost,	supra	note	97,	
at	31‐32.			171 PPACA	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(d)(4).			
172 While	PPACA	requires	that	a	plan	summary	must	“accurately	describe”	the	benefits	and	coverage	a	plan	provides	“so	
that	consumers	may	compare	health	insurance	coverage	and	understand	the	terms	of	coverage	(or	exception	to	such	coverage),”	
it	 also	 requires	 that	 the	 summary	 direct	 the	 consumer	 to	 the	 plan	 itself	 to	 determine	 contractual	 details.	 	 Id.	 sec.	 1001,	 §§	
2715(a),	(b)(3),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	300gg‐15	(West	Supp.	1A	2010);	see	also	Jost,	supra	note	97,	at	32‐34	(discussing	the	“accurately	
describe”	requirement	and	arguing	that	these	descriptions	should	be	legally	binding).	
173 See	 Health	 Connector,	 MassGov.com,	 https://www.mahealthconnector.org/	
portal/site/connector	(last	visited	Mar.	15,	2011).		
174 California	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act,	ch.	655,	sec.	8,	§	100504(a)(9),	2010	Cal.	Stat.	3553,	3563	(to	be	codi‐
fied	at	Cal.	Gov’t	Code	§	100504).		
175 PPACA	requires	employers	to	provide	written	notice	to	employees	regarding	the	existence	of	an	exchange	and	an	em‐
ployee’s	potential	eligibility	 for	a	premium	assistance	 tax	credit	and/or	cost	sharing	reduction,	as	well	as	 the	potential	 loss	of	
employer	contribution	to	an	employer‐sponsored	plan	 if	 the	employee	purchases	coverage	through	the	exchange.	 	PPACA	sec.	
1512,	§	18B,	29	U.S.C.A.	§	218B.	
  
mandate.		PPACA	also	requires	states	to	award	grants	to	entities	serving	as	“navigators.”176		
These	entities	must	perform	outreach	services,	including	public	education	campaigns,	dis‐
tribution	of	information,	and	referrals	to	consumer	assistance	offices.177		Some	states	have	
already	created	navigator‐type	entities	for	public	coverage	options	but	will	have	to	create	
additional	programs	to	target	individuals	likely	to	purchase	coverage	on	the	exchange.		For	
example,	 in	 New	 York,	 community‐based	 organizations,	 consumer	 assistance	 programs,	
and	 facilitated	 enrollers	 conduct	 outreach	 to	 assist	 low‐income	 individuals	 in	 accessing	
public	coverage;	New	York	will	have	to	create	navigators	to	provide	information	regarding	
the	new	exchanges	as	well.178	
b.		Seeking	Consumer	Input	
The	inclusion	of	public	participation	in	the	implementation	and	functioning	of	the	ex‐
changes	will	be	another	component	of	establishing	effective	exchanges	that	are	responsive	
to	consumer	needs.179		Citizen	input	will	create	a	two‐way	flow	of	plan	information,	poten‐
tially	 facilitating	a	dialogue	about	the	efficacy	of	this	revised	health	care	market.	 	PPACA	
requires	that	states	engage	consumers	during	 implementation	of	the	exchanges	and	that	
they	seek	continued	input	regarding	plan	quality.	
 
176 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(i)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010).	177 Id.	
178 See	N.Y.	State	Health	Found.,	 Implementing	Federal	Health	Care	Reform:	 	A	Roadmap	 for	New	York	State	 32	
(2010)	(describing	the	duties	of	navigators	and	qualifications	for	eligibility	to	serve	as	a	navigator	in	the	state).		
179 Including	greater	public	participation	in	health	plans	themselves	is	also	a	component	of	PPACA.		The	law	includes	fund‐
ing	for	the	establishment	of	the	Consumer	Operated	and	Oriented	Plan	(“CO‐OP”)	program,	which	will	both	increase	competition	
and	provide	new	consumer‐directed	options	to	the	health	insurance	market.		PPACA	§	1322,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18042.		
 To	do	this,	PPACA	mandates	that	states	consult	with	diverse	stakeholders	in	establish‐
ing	exchanges,	including	health	care	consumers	enrolled	in	qualified	plans.180		Colorado	has	
taken	 the	 lead	 in	 engaging	 the	 public,	 holding	weekly	 “office	 hours”	with	 the	 director	 of	
health‐reform	 implementation	 and	organizing	150	outreach	 activities—including	 forums,	
conferences,	and	press	conferences—since	April	2010.181	 	Other	states	have	focused	their	
efforts	 to	 engage	 stakeholders	 on	 soliciting	 the	 opinions	 of	 varying	 interest	 groups	 by	
creating	 diverse	 advisory	 boards,	 rather	 than	 opening	 the	 floor	 to	 the	 greater	 public.182		
Whether	 the	 latter	approach	will	 constitute	adequate	 “stakeholder	 involvement”	 remains	
to	be	seen—to	date,	interim	guidance	issued	by	the	Office	of	Consumer	Information	and	In‐
surance	 Oversight	 (OCIIO)	 has	 been	 limited.	 	 OCIIO’s	 “Initial	 Guidance	 to	 States	 on	 Ex‐
changes”	mentions	the	importance	of	public	involvement	in	setting	up	the	exchanges,	stat‐
ing	that	“[s]uccessful	exchanges	will	work	closely	with	consumer	advocates,”	among	other	
stakeholders.183	 	Further	regulatory	guidance	on	the	types	of	stakeholders	to	 involve,	 the	
degree	of	 involvement,	or	 the	responsiveness	of	 the	exchange	to	public	comment	has	not	
been	provided.	 	Nonetheless,	 incorporating	 consumer	 input	may	prove	beneficial	 even	 if	
not	a	regulatory	obligation.		Indeed,	even	without	this	mandate,	public	input	may	prove	to	
be	a	necessary	element	of	meeting	the	duty	to	ensure	that	certified	plans	are	“in	the	inter‐
ests	of	qualified	individuals	and	qualified	employers.”184	
 
180 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(d)(6).	181 See	Meinhold,	supra	note	149,	at	26	(describing	Colorado’s	outreach	activities).		
182 See	Getting	Organized—How	States	Are	Preparing	to	Implement	National	Health	Reform,	States	in	Action	(The	Com‐
monwealth	Fund,	New	York,	N.Y.),	July–Aug.	2010,	at	10‐12	(describing	outreach	efforts	in	Pennsylvania	and	Virginia).	183 Office	of	Consumer	Info.	&	Ins.	Oversight,	supra	note	126.	
184 PPACA	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(e)(1).		
  
In	 addition	 to	 their	 role	 in	 giving	 input	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 exchanges	 them‐
selves,	citizens	will	also	provide	feedback	on	the	health	insurance	plans	offered	through	the	
exchanges.		Section	1311(c)	of	PPACA	is	the	primary	vehicle	for	the	transmission	of	infor‐
mation	about	health	 insurance	plans	offered	through	the	exchanges.	 	As	discussed	above,	
plan	 ratings	 will	 be	 based	 in	 part	 on	 an	 “enrollee	 satisfaction	 survey	 system”	 that	 §	
1311(c)(4)	 requires	 the	Secretary	 to	establish.185	 	This	 survey	 system,	modeled	after	 the	
system	 in	place	 for	 the	Federal	Employee	Health	Benefit	Program,186	and,	 similar	 to	con‐
sumer	review	tools	 that	have	become	ubiquitous	 in	online	markets	 for	other	products,187	
provides	an	opportunity	for	consumers	to	comment	on	their	satisfaction	with	their	health	
plans.		These	reviews	will	help	structure	the	landscape	of	plans	that	are	offered	through	the	
exchanges.		The	enrollee‐satisfaction	component	is	intended	to	“make	the	proposed	health	
care	exchange	easier	to	navigate	while	also	providing	consumers	an	effective	way	to	hold	
their	insurance	company	accountable.”188	
4.		Summary	
The	characteristics	described	in	this	Part	create	only	the	potential	for	meaningful	citi‐
zen	engagement.	System	design	will	be	critical	in	determining	whether	the	capacity	for	ef‐
 
185 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(c)(4).	
186 Press	Release,	Sen.	Mark	Pryor,	Pryor	Adds	Consumer‐Friendly	Tool	 to	Simplify	Health	Care	Choices,	Hold	 Insurance	
Companies	Accountable	(Dec.	7,	2009),	available	at	http://pryor.senate.gov/newsroom/details.cfm?id=320497&.	
187 See	Ezra	Klein,	Mark	Pryor	Makes	the	Health	Insurance	Exchanges	a	Bit	More	Like	Amazon.com,	Wash.	Post	Blog	(Dec.	7,	
2009,	4:37	PM),	http://voices.washingtonpost.com/	
ezra‐klein/2009/12/mark_pryor_makes_the_health_in.html	(comparing	the	survey	system	to	consumer	reviews	prevalent	on	on‐
line	shopping	sites	like	Amazon.com).		
188 Press	Release,	supra	note	186.		
 fective	 citizenship	practices	 is	 actually	enhanced	under	PPACA.189	 	 Its	 construction	as	a	
private	market‐based	social	insurance	system	with	multiple	risk	pools,	for	example,	posi‐
tions	it	differently	than	Social	Security.		Campbell	found	that	the	uniformity	of	rules	in	So‐
cial	 Security	 signals	 that	 each	 person’s	 participation	 is	 equally	 legitimate,	 which	 in	 turn	
produces	more	such	activity.190		PPACA	is	neither	entirely	uniform	the	way	Social	Security	
is	nor	is	it	a	fully	means‐tested	program	like	Medicaid.191	
There	 is	 ample	 authority	 in	PPACA	 for	policymaking	 that	would	 enhance	participatory	
governance,	especially	at	 the	exchange	 level.	 	 Just	as	 the	 impact	of	 Social	Security	was	un‐
known	at	the	time	of	its	enactment,	the	full	potential	for	development	of	citizenship	practices	
under	PPACA	is	currently	unknown.	Much	will	depend	on	state‐level	initiatives	and	whether	
federal	officials	permit	or	facilitate	such	initiatives.	
C.		Social	Meanings	of	PPACA	
Although	one	cannot	be	sure	today	of	how	significant	the	opportunities	for	the	exercise	
of	participation	rights	may	become	under	PPACA,	the	essential	functions	and	components	
of	social	insurance	systems—which	mimic	citizenship	norms—exist	in	PPACA’s	structure.	
First,	 PPACA	 creates	 a	 system	 of	 multiple	 mutual	 benefits	 among	 individual	 partici‐
pants.		The	benefits	to	each	person	are	unpredictable	and	contingent:		Person	A	may	reap	
only	modest	value	from	years	of	investment	through	the	payment	of	premiums,	but	she	is	
 
189 See	Campbell,	supra	note	73	at	125‐37	(describing	survey	results	finding	that	participation	rates	differed	across	different	
benefit	programs);	Cohen,	supra	note	48,	at	23‐37,	66‐69,	345‐357	(describing	the	impact	that	consumers	can	have	and	the	partici‐
pation	and	citizen	activity	of	consumer	movements	throughout	the	twentieth	century).	
190 Campbell,	supra	note	73,	at	138.	
191 Campbell	attributes	lower	levels	of	political	engagement	by	participants	in	means‐tested	programs	in	part	to	the	contrast	
between	a	professionalized	Social	Security	bureaucracy	that	applies	clear	standards	to	an	entire	population	and	programs	for	the	
needy	characterized	by	stigma,	red	tape,	and	complex	eligibility	criteria.		Id.	at	129‐32.	
  
virtually	 certain	 to	 realize	 some	 significant	 benefits	 over	 time.	 	 In	 such	 a	 system,	 formal	
constraints	are	necessary	to	prevent	free‐rider	problems.	 	Other	mutual	financial	benefits	
include	protection	against	wasteful	use	of	public	funds	to	compensate	providers	for	treat‐
ments	 furnished	 to	 the	uninsured	 and	 the	 reduction	of	 transaction	 costs	 in	providing	 all	
medical	treatments.	
There	 is	 also	 mutual	 benefit	 in	 the	 spillover	 of	 positive	 externalities	that	 accrue	 to	
population	health	and	thus	 to	participants	collectively.		Public	health	studies	have	shown	
that	insurance	status	is	positively	correlated	with	improved	health	outcomes	for	individu‐
als.192	Economic	analyses	suggest	that	 increasing	health	 insurance	coverage	 in	the	United	
States	would	result	in	large	national‐level	socio‐economic	gains.193		In	addition,	recent	out‐
breaks	 of	 infectious	 diseases,	 often	 on	 a	 global	 scale,	 indicate	 that	 removing	 barriers	 to	
treatment	 for	 those	 exposed	 to	 such	 diseases	 is	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	 defense	 of	 a	
community.194	
Second,	PPACA	creates	reciprocal	obligations.		The	system’s	provision	of	health	insur‐
ance	will	provide	protection	to	the	individual	against	possibly	devastating	financial	risk	in	
exchange	for	the	relatively	minor	obligation	to	purchase	it.		Government	is	in	effect	insur‐
ing	the	insurers.		On	a	more	philosophical	level,	the	new	law	will	strengthen	social	norms	
 
192 See,	 e.g.,	 Peter	 Franks	 et	 al.,	 Health	 Insurance	 and	Mortality:	 Evidence	 from	 a	National	 Cohort,	 270	 JAMA	 737,	 740	
(1993)	(finding	that	insurance	has	a	similar	effect	on	mortality	as	socioeconomic	status,	education,	and	self‐rated	health).			
193 See	James	A.	Thorton	&	Jennifer	L.	Rice,	Does	Extending	Health	Insurance	Coverage	to	the	Uninsured	Improve	Popula‐
tion	Health	Outcomes?,	6	Applied	Health	Econ.	&	Health	Pol’y	217,	228	(2008)	(“[T]here	may	be	large	social	economic	benefits	
and	net	benefits	from	extending	health	insurance	coverage	to	the	uninsured.”).	194 See,	e.g.,	Matthew	K.	Wynia	&	Lawrence	Gostin,	The	Bioterrorist	Threat	and	Access	to	Health	Care,	296	Science	1613,	
1613	(2002)	(noting	that	uninsured	Americans	who	could	not	access	evaluation	and	care	for	infectious	disease	pose	a	national	
security	threat	in	the	event	of	a	bioterrorism	attack).	
 of	solidarity	and	responsibility	and	extend	a	deeper	consciousness	of	these	norms	to	pub‐
lic	discourse	related	to	the	health	care	system.	
In	sum,	PPACA	extends	the	functional	aspects	of	citizenship	to	the	American	health	care	
system	for	the	first	time.	 	Rather	than	privatizing	health	care,	as	has	recently	occurred	in	
nations	that	adopted	a	much	more	public	system	after	World	War	II,	the	United	States	has	
approached	a	social	 insurance	system	from	essentially	the	opposite	direction.	 	PPACA	re‐
tains	a	private	system	of	market	exchange,	but	 “publicizes”	 it	by	 importing	a	 limited,	but	
significant,	set	of	publicsector	characteristics.	
What	remains	missing	is	a	coherent,	broadly	shared	public	narrative	about	the	meaning	
of	PPACA.		The	frustration	and	delay	of	that	component	of	the	law’s	potential	has	been	the	
primary	achievement	so	far	of	the	campaign	of	constitutional	challenges	against	it.		Assum‐
ing	 that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 eventually	 upholds	 PPACA,	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 exchanges	 in	
2014	may	create	a	fresh	opportunity	for	socialmeaning	entrepreneurs	to	create	the	founda‐
tions	for	health	care	system	citizenship	practices.	
Conclusion	
Governance	 processes—and	 not	 simply	 the	 rules	 that	 establish	 program	 content	 and	
eligibility—have	a	profound	effect	on	whether	the	broader	 impact	of	a	reform	will	be	ex‐
pressive	of	democratic	values.		A	social	welfare	reform	of	the	magnitude	of	PPACA	will	al‐
most	certainly	generate	new	citizenship	practices	vis‐à‐vis	the	health	system,	although	the	
direction	of	that	change	is	not	yet	clear.		The	two	most	important	aspects	of	new	citizenship	
practices	that	could	develop	under	PPACA	are	its	potential,	over	time,	to	instantiate	a	new	
  
reciprocal	 covenant	 of	 mutual	 security,	 and	 its	 potential	 to	 enhance	 participatory	
self‐governance.	
It	will	be	years	before	we	know	whether	the	new	health	reform	law	will	alter	the	social	
meaning	of	membership	in	the	American	community,	and	if	so,	how.		PPACA	represents	the	
first	attempt	in	U.S.	history	to	provide	(almost)	universal	health	insurance,	yet	it	does	so	in	
a	way	that	preserves	a	fragmented	market	and	perpetuates	structural	inequalities	in	access	
to	coverage.		As	this	Article	goes	to	press,	there	is	no	assurance	that	the	new	law—and	es‐
pecially	the	individual	mandate—will	even	survive	judicial	scrutiny.195	
Lacking	a	crystal	ball	and	in	recognition	of	two	earlier,	bitterly	fought	efforts	to	secure	
new	public	goods,	let	me	close	by	borrowing	from	both	Benjamin	Franklin196	and	the	health	
reform	 proposal	 advanced	 by	 President	 Clinton197:	 	 What	 have	 we	 created	 by	 enacting	
PPACA?		It’s	a	health	security	system,	if	you	can	keep	it.	
	
 
195 See	supra	note	98	(citing	cases	challenging	PPACA).	
196 Franklin	engaged	in	the	following	exchange	after	the	conclusion	of	the	Constitutional	Convention:		“‘Well,	Doctor,	what	
have	we	got—a	Republic	or	a	Monarchy?’		‘A	Republic,	if	you	can	keep	it.’”		Respectfully	Quoted:		A	Dictionary	of	Quotations	
from	the	Library	of	Congress	299	(Suzy	Platt	ed.,	1992).	
197 See	American	Health	Security	Act	of	1993,	H.R.	1200,	103d	Cong.	§	101	(1993)	(“establish[ing]	.	.	.	a	State‐Based	American	
Health	Security	Program”	(emphasis	added)).	
